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INTRODUCTION 
A clear, efficient, and fair mechanism for resolving election disputes is 
an important aspect of smooth presidential succession.  It is also something 
that our Constitution has lacked from its inception, and the adverse 
consequences of its absence were most recently apparent in the 2000 
election.  The 1876 Hayes-Tilden election, which required an Electoral 
Commission to resolve disputes about presidential electors, was the most 
severe manifestation of this presidential succession gap.  As such, it also 
should have represented the best opportunity to fix the problem.  Indeed, 
shortly after the Senate passed the Electoral Commission bill, then 
candidate Rutherford B. Hayes reflected that the occasion presented such an 
opportunity to revisit the subject of presidential elections. 
Before another Presidential Election this whole subject of the Presidential 
Election ought to be thoroughly considered, and a radical change made.  It 
is probable that no wise measure can be devised which does not require an 
amendment of the Constitution.  Let proposed Amendments be maturely 
considered.  Something ought to be done immediately.1 
Instead of wholesale reform and constitutional amendment, Congress spent 
the next eleven years focusing its energy on a joint rule and then a statutory 
fix to the problem.  The resulting statute, the Electoral Count Act,2 is 
confusing, unwieldy and fails to account for all the problems the 
Constitution creates for disputed presidential elections.  It also represents a 
complete rejection of the Electoral Commission model.  In this paper, we 
piece together all congressional action on this matter in the aftermath of the 
Hayes-Tilden 1876 election leading up to the passage of the Electoral Count 
Act in an effort to explain why Congress missed this opportunity and turned 
away from the Electoral Commission model. 
 
 1. RUTHERFORD BIRCHARD HAYES, DIARY & LETTERS OF RUTHERFORD BIRCHARD 
HAYES:  NINETEENTH PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 70–71 (D. MCKAY CO. 1964). 
 2. Pub. L. No. 98-456, 98 Stat. 1748 (codified at 3 U.S.C. § 15 (2006)). 
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I.  THE TWELFTH AMENDMENT PROBLEM 
In another article we have detailed the problems and gaps that the 
Twelfth Amendment to the Constitution has created for our system of 
electing the President.3 Briefly, the Twelfth Amendment provides the joint 
session of Congress with instructions for conducting the electoral vote.4  
The Amendment is wordy, but the language that causes the most problems 
is relatively short:  “The President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the 
Senate and House of Representatives, open all the certificates and the votes 
shall then be counted.”5  This is all the direction the Constitution provides 
to the joint session, and one can quickly see the problems it creates if there 
is a dispute.  For instance, what does the language say about who is to count 
or determine the validity of electoral votes?  One can make the argument, as 
some have, that this authority is vested exclusively in the President of the 
Senate, with the two Houses being merely onlookers.  Alternatively, as 
others have claimed, one can contend that Congress has authority under the 
Necessary and Proper Clause6 to fill the gap that exists in the constitutional 
text.  The key point, however, is that because the constitutional ambiguity 
remains unless and until there is a constitutional amendment to fix it, 
different arguments can be made to support one or the other of these 
interpretations depending on the politically strategic reasons for doing so.7 
Even if it were settled who has the final constitutional authority to decide 
which Electoral College votes from a state are entitled to be counted, 
subsidiary questions arise over how to exercise this authority if there is a 
dispute over electoral votes.  For example, can the vote counter reject 
votes?  How should the vote counter choose among competing votes?  
These are just a few of the questions posed by the text of the Twelfth 
Amendment,8 and as we detailed in our article, many of the issues have 
arisen in our history.  The most glaring example was the Hayes-Tilden 
Election Dispute. 
A.  The Hayes-Tilden Election Dispute and the Electoral Commission 
The question of what to do when faced with competing electoral returns 
from a single state reared its head in the Hayes-Tilden dispute.  In the 
aftermath of the 1876 presidential election, Congress was faced with thirty-
five disputed electoral votes from five states, enough to swing the election 
either way.9  In three southern states, Florida, Louisiana, and South 
 
 3. Nathan L. Colvin & Edward B. Foley, The Twelfth Amendment:  A Constitutional 
Ticking Time Bomb, 64 U. MIAMI L. REV. 475 (2010). 
 4. U.S. CONST. amend. XII. 
 5. Id. 
 6. U.S. CONST. art I § 8, cl. 18. 
 7. See generally Colvin & Foley, supra note 3, at 480–523. 
 8. For a list of others, see id. at 482–83. 
 9. CHARLES FAIRMAN, Five Justices and the Electoral Commission of 1877, in THE 
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE:  THE HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED 
STATES 40–41 (Paul A. Freund & Stanley N. Katz, eds., Supp. 1988).  For another good 
source on the Hayes-Tilden dispute generally, see PAUL LELAND HAWORTH, THE HAYES-
TILDEN DISPUTED PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 1876 (1966).  
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Carolina, multiple electoral certificates were returned, along with 
allegations of fraud, violence, voter intimidation, and corruption.10  In 
Oregon, one elector was possibly ineligible which led to the submission of 
two slates, one including the elector and another with a replacement from 
the other political party.11  If Hayes received all of the disputed electoral 
votes, he would prevail by a margin of one; therefore each dispute was 
critical to the overall outcome.12 
The Constitution was silent as to how to proceed and there was no 
legislation governing the electoral count.  Perhaps worse still, control of 
Congress was split between the Democrats and Republicans, creating a 
loggerhead.13  This was a true crisis in presidential succession.  Without 
some sort of compromise, there was concern that the Republicans, and the 
President of the Senate specifically, would assert that he had the power to 
declare Hayes President.14  Conversely, the Democrats might insist that, 
with no agreement on what to do about the disputed Electoral College 
votes, neither candidate had an outright majority and therefore it fell to the 
House of Representatives to decide the winner.15  If neither side budged, 
there would be a genuine stalemate resolvable only through the force of 
arms.  However, the two parties reached a compromise, agreeing to create a 
bi-partisan Electoral Commission, comprised of five members from each 
house (five Democrats and five Republicans) and four U.S. Supreme Court 
Justices (thought to be two Democrats and two Republicans) who would 
choose a fifth to join them.16  Initially, it was thought that the fifth justice 
would be Justice David Davis, who was considered to be the most 
independent member of the Court.  However, in the midst of all this, Davis 
was selected by the Illinois state legislature to the United States Senate.17  
His replacement on the Commission, Justice Joseph P. Bradley, was 
thought to be a Republican.18  These changes in the presumed composition 
of the Commission made it, at least on its face, appear less evenly bi-
 
 10. Colvin & Foley, supra note 3, at 502–04.  Florida and Louisiana returned three 
certificates while South Carolina returned two. Id. 
 11. Id. at 504–05. 
 12. Id. at 502–03. 
 13. Id. at 505–06. 
 14. George F. Edmunds, Presidential Elections, 12 AM. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (1877).  The 
Republicans in the House were strong proponents of this view.  Representative James A. 
Garfield was indignant about the Senate’s decision to back the Commission, writing to 
Rutherford B. Hayes that the Senate simply needed to “support its presiding officer in 
following the early precedents, which were made under the fresh impulses of the 
constitution.” 1 THEODORE CLARKE SMITH, THE LIFE AND LETTERS OF JAMES ABRAM 
GARFIELD 629 (1925).  Garfield took this position to the House floor for over an hour and he 
ultimately received 79 of 83 votes to serve on the Commission from the party caucus. Id. at 
630–31.  As will be seen in this paper, many Democrats remained angry over this possibility 
through the rest of the decade.  
 15. Samuel J. Tilden himself, and his most fervent followers, continued to assert this 
position up until almost the very end, Inauguration Day, and there were fears that they were 
lining up military officers to support this stance, with the consequence that another civil war 
might erupt. Edmunds, supra note 14, at 3–4. 
 16. FAIRMAN, supra note 9, at 48–49. 
 17. Id. at 54. 
 18. Id. 
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partisan.19  Congress was effectively bound to the Commission’s findings 
unless both Houses rejected the findings, unlikely given the partisan split of 
Congress.20 
The key question for the Commission, from a legal standpoint, ultimately 
turned on whether a state was entitled to alter the official determination of 
which presidential electors won the state’s popular vote after the 
congressionally specified date on which the electors were to cast their votes 
for President.  In Florida, the State’s canvassing board had declared the 
Hayes electors to have won the popular vote, despite protests from Samuel 
J. Tilden supporters.  On the specified day in December, the Hayes electors 
cast their votes for their candidates, and their votes were certified by the 
State’s Governor.  The Tilden electors met the same day, and got the State’s 
Attorney General (a Democrat) to certify their vote.  More significantly, in 
January, the State had a new Governor—and a new legislature—and 
pursuant to a new statute, the new Governor (also a Democrat) certified that 
the Tilden electors had been the true popularly elected ones.  The Electoral 
Commission, on a straight party-line vote, split in ruling that the 
certification of the Hayes electors was the only one in compliance with the 
U.S. Constitution.  In his decisive opinion, Justice Bradley explained his 
view that the Constitution’s requirement that presidential electors in all 
states cast their votes for President on the same day implicitly precluded a 
state, like Florida, from subsequently determining that the wrong electors 
had been certified winners of the popular vote. 21 
B.  Congress’s Missed Opportunity 
In the aftermath of this experience, it was clear that Congress needed to 
do something to fix the problem posed by the Twelfth Amendment.  
However, it was not as if Congress was operating on a blank slate.  Indeed, 
since the first electoral count, Congress employed or proposed numerous 
methods or bodies for resolving electoral count disputes, including joint 
rules, legislation, constitutional amendments, committees, the Supreme 
Court, and an Electoral Commission.22 
During the eleven years of debate leading up to the Electoral Count Act, 
many of these methods were debated.  Congress could have reexamined and 
modified the Electoral Commission model.  While there was some wide 
dissatisfaction with the way the Commission worked, it was not as if it was 
 
 19. Indeed, Hayes noted in his diary, upon the selection of Justice Joseph P. Bradley, the 
odds of him prevailing in Washington D.C. had increased to five to one in his favor. HAYES, 
supra note 1, at 71. 
 20. See FAIRMAN, supra note 9, at 49.  It was conceivable that one side or the other 
might claim unilateral authority to declare the winner even after the Commission’s ruling, 
notwithstanding the statutory directive that both Houses needed to overturn a Commission 
decision.  But, as a practical matter, once the Commission ruled, public opinion would not 
tolerate either side attempting to negate its decision unilaterally. 
 21. Colvin & Foley, supra note 3, at 507–16.  Hayes himself described the votes as a 
strictly “party” vote and noted that they demonstrated the “strength of party ties.” HAYES, 
supra note 1, at 73. 
 22. See generally Colvin & Foley, supra note 3. 
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a total failure.23  It would have been possible to adopt the general concept 
while making modifications to reduce the partisanship and perception that 
the outcome would be fait accompli.  For instance, the number of 
commissioners could have been reduced, members could have been selected 
from outside Congress, and Congress could have determined a better way to 
select a neutral tiebreaker by not limiting the pool to sitting Supreme Court 
justices.  However, Congress did not seriously consider employing the 
Commission model.  Instead, it adopted legislation that went back to the old 
model of relying on Congress to resolve these disputes. 
Moreover, the need to fix the problem with the Twelfth Amendment that 
provoked the crisis of 1876 gave the nation and its leading statesmen the 
opportunity to confront the role of political parties in democratic elections 
in a way that the Framers of the Constitution (and even the Twelfth 
Amendment) had not done.  The problem that proved visible in 1876 was 
one rooted in two-party conflict:  neither side could rise above its partisan 
desire to win the Presidency in order to resolve the vote-counting dispute 
impartially, and therefore any institution charged with resolving this dispute 
inevitably would act based on partisan motives if that institution was 
dominated by one party or the other.  This partisan dynamic was one that 
had not been anticipated by the Framers, because they had hoped that they 
had designed the Electoral College in a way to avoid the effects of 
partisanships in presidential elections.24  Obviously, the Framers were 
sorely mistaken in this respect, as became obvious by the election of 
1800.25  But even as the Founding Generation adopted the Twelfth 
 
 23. The Commission model represented a bi-partisan compromise that averted a 
potential crisis in presidential succession.  Because both sides considered acting 
unilaterally—the Republicans through the President of the Senate, the Democrats through 
the House—there were serious rumblings about the use of arms, and President Ulysses S. 
Grant in fact deployed troops over concerns of civil unrest.  The dispute never turned into 
open warfare, and the Electoral Commission compromise led to a relatively peaceful 
presidential succession. Norman J. Ornsetin, Three Disputed Elections:  1800, 1824, 1876, in 
AFTER THE PEOPLE VOTE:  A GUIDE TO THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE 29, 35 (John C. Fortier ed., 
3d ed. 2004) (noting President Grant’s deployment of troops).  Senator George F. Edmunds 
defended the use of the Electoral Commission, later stating that he was certain that the 
Senate would have declared Hayes as the winner and the House would have declared Tilden 
as the winner with the resolution coming by a resulting armed conflict. Edmunds, supra note 
14, at 3–4. 
 24. One of us has written on how this misunderstanding about the Electoral College was 
part of a broader misunderstanding by the Founders on how partisanship would affect 
disputed elections for the chief executive, whether governor or president. See Edward B. 
Foley, The Founders’ Bush v. Gore, 44 IND. L. REV. (forthcoming). 
 25. The most significant problem was that originally members of the Electoral College 
could only vote for President.  The Vice President would then be the candidate with the 
second most votes.  The Framers did not seem to anticipate that this might mean the Presidnt 
and Vice President would be political enemies.  To prevent this result, the members of the 
Electoral College had to be especially strategic in casting their votes.  In 1800, the 
Democratic-Republicans failed at this task and cast the same number of votes for the 
Presidential candidates (Thomas Jefferson) and his “running mate” Aaron Burr, tossing the 
election to the House of Representatives. See generally SUSAN DUNN, JEFFERSON’S SECOND 
REVOLUTION:  THE ELECTION CRISIS OF 1800 AND THE TRIUMPH OF REPUBLICANISM (2004); 
JOHN FERLING, ADAMS VS. JEFFERSON:  THE TUMULTUOUS ELECTION OF 1800 (2004); 
EDWARD J. LARSON, A MAGNIFICENT CATASTROPHE:  THE TUMULTUOUS ELECTION OF 1800, 
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Amendment to fix the defect in the Electoral College that had surfaced in 
1800,the Founders did not have the foresight to use the Twelfth 
Amendment as a vehicle to handle the problem of partisanship in a dispute 
over counting ballots cast for a state’s presidential electors.  The authors of 
the Twelfth Amendment, had they been clairvoyant, could have designed a 
neutral institution—better than the ad hoc Electoral Commission of 1877—
to handle this kind of dispute.  But they did not.  More significantly, in the 
aftermath of the Electoral Commission’s work in 1877, the statesmen of 
that time (if they had been acting in the public-minded spirit of the 
Founders), now that they had experienced the consequences of partisan 
motivations in the context of this type of dispute, could have created the 
kind of balanced bipartisan institution that eluded the Founders.  The fact 
that the generation of leaders who lived through 1876–1877 did not create a 
new institution to overcome the effects of partisanship in a disputed 
presidential election is the most significant negative legacy of their 
experience. 
The 2000 presidential election brought Congress’s inadequate response 
to the Hayes-Tilden dispute to the forefront.  Again, Supreme Court justices 
would play a pivotal role in resolving the dispute, this time sitting as a court 
and deciding Bush v. Gore.26  The Electoral Count Act failed to resolve all 
the problems and questions created by the Constitution.  Had the Supreme 
Court declined to intervene, it is quite possible, perhaps even likely, that 
two slates of electors, one favoring Al Gore and one favoring George W. 
Bush, would have been sent to Congress.27  In 2000 the Congress was 
divided:  the House was Republican and the Senate was tied, with Al Gore 
having the authority to cast the tiebreaking vote.  Predicting how that 
Congress would have reacted to such a scenario is an impossible task.28  
This scenario, and the crisis it would have created, provide the best 
justification for the Supreme Court’s intervention in the 2000 election.29  
Like 1876, the 2000 election dispute represents another presidential 
succession crises averted, less than a year before the September 11th 
attacks.30 
 
AMERICA’S FIRST PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN (2007); BERNARD A. WEISBERGER, AMERICA 
AFIRE:  JEFFERSON, ADAMS, AND THE REVOLUTIONARY ELECTION OF 1800 (2000). 
 26. 531 U.S. 98 (2000), cert granted, 531 U.S. 1046 (2000).  Perhaps it was appropriate 
that again it appeared U.S. Supreme Court Justice Kennedy, like Justice Joseph P. Bradley in 
1876, held the fate of the election in his hands as the “swing vote.” 
 27. Indeed, the Florida legislature was prepared to appoint a George W. Bush slate of 
electors in the event the Supreme Court did not intervene. Colvin & Foley, supra note 3, at 
529 n.282. 
 28. For some speculation on various scenarios, see Colvin & Foley, supra note 3, at 
522–23, 528–31. 
 29. Bush, 531 U.S. at 1046, 1047 (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that grant of certiorari 
was necessary to prevent “casting a cloud” upon the legitimacy of the election); RICHARD A. 
POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 327–31 (2003) (summarizing possible 
scenarios, problems with the Electoral Count Act (ECA) and the crises that the Court’s 
intervention averted). 
 30. POSNER supra note 29, at 331 (“Had the worst-case scenario that the decision averted 
come to pass, the forty-third President would have taken office after long delay, with no 
transition, with greatly impaired authority, perhaps amid unprecedented partisan bickering 
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Thus, the primary lesson of 1876 and 2000 is that our constitutional 
system for resolving presidential election disputes is flawed.  The Congress 
of 1887 thought it was addressing this problem, but even they knew that 
their legislation was a less-than-ideal substitute for a much-needed 
constitutional amendment, and the lesson of 2000 is that the Electoral 
Count Act is woefully inadequate.  Together, the two disputes demonstrate 
the need for a neutral institution to resolve election disputes, something in 
the likeness of the flawed but successful Electoral Commission.  This paper 
will explain why the Electoral Count Act prevailed where other ideas, such 
as a neutral body, joint rules, or constitutional amendments, failed.  
Additionally, the paper should shed light as to why it took Congress eleven 
years to reach a resolution in the aftermath of Hayes-Tilden and why the 
resulting legislation was so confusing.31  Our hope is that this historical 
inquiry will also create a foundation for considering how politicians and 
scholars might fix the problem and fill this gap in the law of presidential 
succession.32 
II.  CONGRESS’S RESPONSE TO THE HAYES-TILDEN DISPUTE 
Because of the length of this article and complexity of the legislative 
history, we decided that it would be easier on the reader to explain some 
conclusions at the outset.  First, a primary driver for the difficulty of fixing 
the electoral count was the diversity of opinions on the subject in Congress.  
The only point of agreement was that there was a problem that required 
resolution, and we did not come across a statement from a member of 
Congress suggesting that they should do nothing.  But beyond that, opinions 
were divided, often in many directions, on nearly every single aspect of 
resolving the problem. 
In this respect, the debate, particularly early on, differs from how we 
understand the way legislation is often crafted.  Here, perhaps surprisingly, 
 
and bitterness, leaving a trail of poisonous suspicion of covert deals and corrupt maneuvers, 
and after an interregnum unsettling to the global and the U.S. domestic economy and 
possibly threatening world peace.”). 
 31. One scholar, shortly after the passage of the Electoral Count Act, described it as 
“[t]he most complicated bit of governmental machinery which the modern world has to 
exhibit.” John W. Burgess, The Law of the Electoral Count, 3 POL. SCI. Q. 633 (1888).  For a 
thorough discussion of the resulting legislation, see Stephen A. Siegel, The Conscientious 
Congressman’s Guide to the Electoral Count Act of 1887, 56 FLA. L. REV. 541 (2004). See 
also Eric Schickler, Terri Bimes & Robert W. Mickey, Safe at Any Speed:  Legislative 
Intent, the Electoral Count Act of 1887, and Bush v. Gore, 16 J.L. & POL. 717 (2000).  The 
possible unconstitutionality of the Electoral Count Act has also been addressed. Vasan 
Kesavan, Is the Electoral Count Act Unconstitutional?, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1653 (2002). 
 32. Our work on this topic has included an exercise using a model election court based 
on a McCain v. Obama hypothetical case.  The project was co-sponsored by Election Law @ 
Moritz, the AEI-Brookings Election Reform Project, and the Supreme Court Institute.  In an 
effort to create a neutral body, the model court was composed of two judges from different 
backgrounds who came together to select a third member of the panel.  For more information 
on the project, see Election Law @ Moritz, Election Court, 
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/index.php. See also Edward B. Foley, The McCain v. 
Obama Simulation:  A Hypothetical Variation on Bush v. Gore (forthcoming, draft on file 
with author). 
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partisan legislative politics did not organize views into two competing 
teams.  Instead, members from both parties offered a wide variety of 
proposals.  Two-party conflict may have been a factor in preventing any 
legislative solution until 1887, but two-party conflict cannot be the sole 
explanation for the cacophony of congressional voices on this topic. 
For instance, members of Congress could not agree on the appropriate 
method to resolve the problem:  constitutional amendment, legislation, or 
joint rule.  They disagreed about who possessed the power to conduct the 
count:  the President of the Senate, the Houses acting together, the two 
Houses acting separately, or the two Houses acting together and voting as 
state delegations.  They disagreed as to whether a legislative act would bind 
a future Congress on the matter.  On what would prove to be one of the 
more important sources of disagreement, they disagreed about whether they 
might come up with a new system, perhaps vesting the power to count in 
the Supreme Court or Chief Justice.  Members of Congress disagreed about 
the extent of the power to conduct the electoral count, about how much 
deference to give the states, or whether Congress could even reject returns. 
Problematic in all of these opinions was that they often did not avail to 
compromise.  For instance, an adamant believer that a constitutional 
amendment is necessary could not possibly compromise with someone who 
believed that Congress could legislate on the matter.  As will be seen, some 
of these arguments were likely grounded in partisan or institutional 
concerns, but there are several cases of individuals taking stances to their 
own party’s or institution’s detriment. 
Second, it does not appear that Congress seriously considered adopting 
the model of the Electoral Commission or some alternative.  This was true 
despite the fact that a framer of the Electoral Commission,33 Senator 
George F. Edmunds, was also the primary author of the Electoral Count 
Act.  Professor Stephen A. Siegel, in his own review of the Electoral Count 
Act’s (ECA’s) legislative history for a different purpose than ours,34 was 
uncertain whether this was because Congress believed that the job belonged 
to them, as a matter of policy, or because Congress believed a constitutional 
amendment was necessary to create a different arbiter.35  Additionally, the 
legislative history reveals two more explanations.  First, there was overall 
dissatisfaction with the Electoral Commission, particularly from the 
Democrats who found themselves in control of Congress soon after the 
Hayes election.  Second, at the start of the debates the Democrats in 
Congress were in complete control for the first time in a long time and 
 
 33. Obituary, George F. Edmunds, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 1919, at 11. 
 34. Siegel sought to discern the true meaning of the ECA and to advise modern-day 
members of Congress on how to enforce the statute’s directives.  Our goal is to understand 
why Congress missed the opportunity that it had in the aftermath of 1877 to fix the problem 
inherent in the Twelfth Amendment. 
 35. Siegel, supra note 31, at 555 (“[I]t is unclear whether the failure to legislate some 
tribunal other than Congress as the ultimate arbiter of the electoral count was because 
Congress believed, as a matter of policy, it should not move it elsewhere, or because 
Congress believed that in the absence of a constitutional amendment, it could not move the 
responsibility elsewhere.”). 
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viewed the Electoral Commission as one event in a line of Republican 
abuses going back to the Twenty-Second Joint Rule.36 
This point leads to the third conclusion, which is that early failures to 
compromise by Congress were a result of this partisanship.  Some 
Democrats wished to operate under their own version of the Twenty-
Second Joint Rule, which would make rejecting electoral votes easy.  
Knowing the Republican President would never sign that type of bill, the 
Democrats sought to create a joint rule.  Later, only when congressional 
control was split between the parties did the congressional actors move 
beyond the idea of using a joint rule and insisting on legislation.  It seems it 
was necessary for congressional control to be split between the political 
parties in order to cool partisan temptations.  The debate becomes much 
more civil and serious when this happens and eventually leads to a 
resolution. 
The fourth conclusion is that once congressional control split between the 
parties, the substance of the debate was also altered.  The concern during 
the debate was less about which party will receive an advantage, but rather 
whether the proposal would give more power to one of the two Houses of 
Congress.  This led to further delay in a resolution. 
Moreover, there were several close presidential elections during the 
period of Congress’s attempts to fix the system.  The final conclusion is that 
the close presidential elections did not appear to play a central role in the 
debates or passage of the legislation.  Members of Congress were certainly 
aware of the close calls, but they do not feature prominently in the debates 
and members rarely mentioned them.  At the same time, it is difficult to 
imagine particularly close elections not impacting the mindset of Congress.  
Thus, this conclusion is tentative and may need revision upon further 
research into historical archives.37 
 
 36. For the full text of the Twenty-Second Joint Rule, see H. Subcomm. On Compilation 
of Precedents, Counting Electoral Votes, H.R. Misc. Doc. No. 44-13, at 256 (2d Sess. 1877).  
The Twenty-Second Joint Rule was the strongest display of Congress’s counting power.  If a 
member of Congress objected to a state’s votes, both Houses would have to agree to count 
the votes or they would be rejected.  Under this rule Congress rejected the votes of several 
southern states in three elections, the only time it ever did this. Colvin & Foley, supra note 3, 
at 497–99. 
 37. One possible explanation is that Congress faced too many significant issues during 
this period.  Civil service reform, civil rights and voting reform, presidential succession, 
tariffs, maintenance of the gold standard, immigration, and race relations in the aftermath of 
Reconstruction were all issues on the national agenda during the period.  Still, it would seem 
possible for Congress to have carved out time for a constitutional amendment had there been 
the political will.  Congress, after all, was able to adopt the Twentieth Amendment in 1933, 
which also concerns presidential elections, during the Great Depression. 
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A.  Forty-Fifth Congress 1877:  Republicans Control the Senate and the 
Democrats Control the House of Representatives 
1.  The House of Representatives Considers a Constitutional Amendment 
The 45th Congress did not feature much serious movement toward 
solving the problems posed by the Twelfth Amendment, except for some 
constitutional amendment proposals.  In the earliest action following the 
Hayes-Tilden dispute, Representative Milton I. Southard (D, OH) 
introduced a resolution to form a committee consisting of eleven members 
for “consideration of the state of law respecting the ascertainment and 
declaration of the result of the election of President.”38  The resolution was 
a response to a committee already formed by the Senate that was authorized 
to work with any committee from the House.39 
This committee, officially entitled the Committee on the State of the Law 
Respecting the Ascertainment and Declaration of Result of Election of 
President and Vice-President, produced a report and suggested amendment 
to the Constitution in May 1878.40  The majority of the Committee, 
unsurprisingly, found that the electoral system was a failure: 
Every reason originally alleged for it has been refuted by experience; its 
operation is inequitable and cannot be otherwise; it is aristocratic in its 
nature; it was founded in distrust of the people and intended as a check 
upon popular will; it is peculiarly open to treachery and fraud, and it has 
brought the country to the verge of revolution and anarchy repeatedly.41 
This language, particularly the concern about fraud and anarchy, certainly 
harkened back to the nation’s collective experience in the previous 
presidential election.  The fundamental change proposed to the electoral 
system was to change the allocation of electoral votes in each state while 
preserving the Electoral College.  Rather than a candidate winning all of a 
state’s electoral votes, the proposal divided each state’s electoral votes 
proportionally among the candidates according to the number of votes they 
received in each state.42 
The upshot of this plan was primarily two fold.  First, and likely most 
important, the majority felt that it was a more accurate expression of the 
entire country’s preference for a particular candidate.  This would be 
accomplished by reducing the likelihood of an election going to the House 
and doing away with the notion that a one-vote victory by a candidate in a 
 
 38. 6 CONG. REC. 132 (1877). 
 39. Id. 
 40. H.R. REP. No. 819 (1878). 
 41. Id. at 1–2. 
 42. Id. at 13.  Specifically, the math in the amendment required multiplying the total 
votes that the candidate received in a state by the whole number of that state’s electoral votes 
and then dividing that number by the total number of votes cast in that state.  That number 
would be kept to the third decimal and would be the number of electoral votes the candidate 
received for that state. Id.  For example, in the election of 1876 New York had thirty-five 
electoral votes.  Under this system, Hayes would have received 16.9 of New York’s votes to 
Tilden’s 18.031. Id. at 12. 
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particular state would net the entirety of that state’s electoral votes.43  
Second, the majority argued that this plan tended to prevent or reduce the 
impact of election fraud.  Noting that under the current plan a local fraud in 
New York, Philadelphia, or Cincinnati had the potential to swing an 
election in New York, Pennsylvania, or Ohio—and then perhaps the 
nation—the majority argued that under this plan such a fraud would have a 
much smaller impact, to the point that parties might not be willing to 
engage in such activities.44 
Indeed the same point is stronger when one considers the fact that it 
would have changed the nature of not only fraud but also all election 
disputes or snafus in presidential elections.  Taking Florida in 2000 as an 
example, some believe the butterfly ballot in Palm Beach County might 
have been sufficient to cost Florida’s electoral votes for Al Gore.  Under 
this proposal, the impact of the ballot problem would have paled in 
comparison.  In fact, it is difficult to imagine that the problem would have 
resulted in any dispute at all. 
The majority’s proposed amendment also included a provision for the 
counting of electoral votes in Congress.  The language would have replaced 
the dreaded passive language in the Twelfth Amendment that left open the 
question of who counts the votes.  In the proposed amendment, the 
President of the Senate would open the votes, but “the electoral votes 
[would] then be counted by the two houses, as certified, unless rejected by 
both houses.”45  In the event of an election dispute in a state, the highest 
judicial tribunal to pass on the dispute was to transmit the decision to the 
President of the Senate and the Houses were bound to follow that decision 
unless both disagreed with it.46  If there were a dispute but no certificate of 
decision, the votes would only be counted if both Houses agreed.47  
Furthermore, 
[i]f there be more than one certificate of electoral votes from any State, 
and no such judicial decision as aforesaid, or if there be more than one 
such decision from any State, in either case that certificate of electoral 
votes which shall be held by both houses to be made by the rightful 
authority, and that judicial decision which shall be held in like manner to 
be made by the rightful tribunal, shall be conclusive, and the votes be 
counted accordingly, unless rejected by both houses.48 
Finally, rather than requiring a candidate to receive a majority of the votes, 
the proposed amendment required only a plurality.  In the event of a tie, 
which was highly unlikely under the amendment due to the use of fractions, 
the vote would immediately go to the House of Representatives as under the 
original plan.49 
 
 43. See id. at 10. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 14. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
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The minority report50 of the Committee took issue with the majority’s 
assertion that the early plan was aristocratic in nature and did not always 
reflect the will of the entire people.51  They insisted that this was not a flaw 
of the system, but the point:  the election of the president was to be “the will 
of the States, expressed in such manner as through their several legislatures 
they might direct . . . [not] as a means of arriving at the aggregate voice of 
all the people of the United States.52  In effect, the minority argued, the 
proposed amendment would violate principles of federalism and states’ 
rights, which were fundamental compromises of the Constitution.53  The 
minority also disagreed with the majority’s contention that the proposed 
amendment would lessen corruption and fervor.54  They argued, instead, 
that this would increase passions in states where elections were once 
considered to be foregone conclusions.55  As to whether this plan would 
reduce contested elections, the minority insisted that instead it would 
nationalize and increase contests as parties hoped to gain fractions all across 
the country in hopes of offsetting fractions they lose in other states.56 
Whatever the merits of the debate between the majority and dissenting 
members of the committee, the majority’s proposal suffered two defects 
that would plague future efforts at reforming the Twelfth Amendment.  
First, not content with only fixing the procedures for resolving disputes 
over ballots cast for presidential electors, the proposal attempted to tackle 
the far more controversial issue of how to distribute Electoral College 
votes.  The proposal’s plan for proportional distribution might be better 
than the largely prevailing system of winner-take-all (today, only Maine 
and Nebraska use a type of proportional system), but getting this idea to 
secure enough support for a constitutional amendment has proven 
impossible throughout U.S. history.  Therefore, any reform of dispute 
resolution procedures that is attached to broader Electoral College reform, 
like the proportionality proposal, has little chance of adoption.  Second, 
even insofar as this proposal focused on dispute resolution, it felt compelled 
 
 50. The majority members of the Committee were not listed in the report.  The minority 
members were H.A. Herbert (D, AL), John. F. House (D, TN), and Eppa Hunton (D, VA), 
all Democrats. See id. at 23.  Assuming the remaining members of the Committee were  in 
the majority, those members would have included, Milton Southard (R, OH), Clarkson N. 
Potter (D, NY), George Bicknell (D, IN), John G. Carlisle (D, KY), Benjamin Butler (R, 
MA), Curtis H. Brogden (R, NC) and Ezekiel S. Sampson (R, IA). Standing and Select 
Committees of the House of Representatives , 45th Cong., 3d Sess., H Misc. Doc. No. 2, at 
11. 
 51. Id. at 15. 
 52. Id. at 16. 
 53. Id. at 18–19.  The minority also noted that nothing was stopping the states from 
adopting a plan similar to this. Id. at 20. 
 54. Id. at 20. 
 55. Id. (“The plan of the committee, giving importance to the ballot of every voter in the 
Union, making every one of eight millions and a half of voters feel that the result might 
depend upon him, would set fire to every State in the Union at once . . . . The same reasoning 
shows that frauds would be perpetrated in States where it is now useless to attempt them.”).  
 56. Id. at 21.  Going further, the minority insisted that this would result in further federal 
encroachment on power in the southern states because of the constant concern of 
intimidation. Id. 
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to give both Houses of Congress, as distinct institutions, a role in the 
dispute-resolution process. 
To be sure, the proposal stated the concurrence of both Houses would be 
necessary in certain circumstances:  for example, both Houses would need 
to agree to count Electoral College votes that lacked state certification, 
while both Houses would need to agree to reject Electoral College votes 
with state certification.  The problem with this sort of procedure is that 
there might be a dispute about whether or not the state certification existed 
(or, similarly, whether an authoritative state judicial decision existed).  If 
the two Houses disagreed on the existence of the condition precedent, then 
the same sort of recipe for a disastrous stalemate existed.  After 1877, 
members of Congress should have recognized the need for a single federal 
institution to be the ultimate authority concerning disputed presidential 
elections, but the jealousy of each House to maintain a distinct institutional 
role in the process was too great to permit learning this obvious lesson. 
2. Senator Edmunds Responds to the Proposed Amendment and Lays the 
Foundation for the Electoral Count Act 
Senator George F. Edmunds was perhaps the most important actor in the 
attempts to reform the election system.  A Republican from Vermont, he 
was an architect of the Electoral Commission and also served as a member 
of the Commission.  In the Senate, Edmunds was a leader of the Republican 
Party and President Pro Tempore of the Senate during much of this era.57  
The Edmunds Bill, as it was often called, would eventually become the 
Electoral Count Act.  Thus, his early impressions on the subject are 
especially relevant.  Edmunds published a law review article on the subject 
in October of 1877.58  In the article, Presidential Elections, Edmunds gave 
his opinion on the Electoral Commission, the proposed Amendment, and 
alternatives to the Amendment. 59 
Regarding the Electoral Commission, Edmunds viewed the gravity of the 
situation as one that “led men of all parties and all views in Congress to 
unite, as one of the simplest and plainest duties of patriotism, in a measure 
of legislation that should peacefully solve the difficulty.”60  Edmunds wrote 
that three characteristics of the Commission were notable in its defense.  
First, the Commission acted uniformly, like a court, allowing the entire 
body to answer questions conclusively.61  Second, the Commission 
included five Supreme Court justices “taken from a body of men learned in 
 
 57. Edmunds served as President Pro Tempore from 1883–1885 and Chairman of the 
Republican Conference from 1885–1891. Biography of George Franklin Edmunds, 
BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS 1774–PRESENT, 
http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=E000056 (last visited Nov. 11, 
2010).   
 58. Edmunds, supra note 14.  Furthermore, the solution “was not, perhaps the best 
theoretically possible, but it was the best practically possible on that occasion.” Id. at 6. 
 59. See generally id. 
 60. Id. at 4. 
 61. Id. This was, of course, in comparison to the idea of the two Houses attempting to 
answer the same questions, which was highly unlikely. See id. 
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the law, withdrawn from active politics, and dependent neither upon the 
favor of the people, of Congress, or the Executive for the permanence of 
their official positions.”62  Third, the Commission was to rule on the issues 
before it “according to the law as it stood before the passage of the act” to 
ensure that the “lawful President was to be ascertained by the same law in 
every respect that existed on the day of the election.”63  It is striking how 
little Edmunds’ own proposal incorporated the strengths of the Commission 
as he viewed it. 
Edmunds wanted reform.  It was the details of the reform that proved 
troublesome.  In responding to the committee’s work, Edmunds started with 
common ground:  the passing of the 1877 crisis did not abrogate Congress’s 
“imperative duty of providing in advance, so far as clear provisions of the 
Constitution or a statute can do, for the disposition of similar dangers and 
disputes in the future.”64  However, the proposed amendment, according to 
Edmunds, was the wrong approach to this problem.  Here, Edmunds largely 
agreed with the minority report that the Amendment would in effect 
nationalize the presidential election, cause more problems with disputes, 
and lead to a more autocratic Presidency.65   
Instead, Edmunds outlined his vision for a solution.  Any law, Edmunds 
posited, must first address “[h]ow far can Congress, under the Constitution, 
authorize any federal tribunal, be it the Houses of Congress, a board, or a 
court, to go in determining the validity of an Electoral vote.”66  On this 
point, Edmunds viewed the “act of the counting commanded by the 
Constitution only as an administrative, not as a judicial, ceremony.”67  
Instead, it would be ideal if “the disputes touching the constitution of the 
Electoral Colleges in the States could be disposed of in advance [of the 
counting of the votes]” and “it would be safer for the peace order and 
justice of the Republic in the long run, to have such disputes settled by 
honest judicial means in the States in which they may occur.”68  Thus, 
Edmunds hoped that an amendment to the Constitution could be avoided if 
states would be willing to resolve the disputes in advance of the voting of 
the Electors and Congress would bind itself to such a decision.69  As will be 
seen, the spirit of Edmunds’ hopes would be later captured in the Electoral 
Count Act. 
It is remarkable that Edmunds, so involved with this issue, did not see the 
overriding need for a new constitutional amendment to fix the defects of the 
Twelfth Amendment.  Equally outstanding, after 1877, is his thought that a 
 
 62. Id. at 6–7.  Edmunds acknowledged that perhaps bias exists in each person, but 
maintained that at least the federal judiciary was the most insulated from the temptations and 
fears that reign over politicians. Id. at 7. 
 63. Id. at 7. 
 64. Id. at 9. 
 65. See id. at 9–15. 
 66. Id. at 16. 
 67. Id. at 17. 
 68. Id. at 18.  Edmunds did not argue that these tribunals would be flawless, just better 
more often than not than the exercise of some centralized power, like Congress. Id. 
 69. Id. at 18–19. 
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dispute over a state’s presidential ballots could be conclusively resolved in 
the state itself, rather than in a national institution.  To be sure, consistent 
with the values of federalism, one might hope—and even instruct—the 
authoritative national institution to bind itself to the decision of a state’s 
tribunal.  But one still needed to identify the single federal national 
institution that would declare a President duly elected.  As long as there was 
the possibility that someone would argue the need to ignore the state’s 
tribunal’s decision—and after 1877 it was inevitable that this sort of 
argument could not be foreclosed—then to avoid anarchy there needed to 
be a national institution authorized to reject that claim and pronounce that 
the ruling of the state tribunal would be followed.  Edmunds’ failure to 
recognize this basic point is baffling and would prove to be the Achilles 
Heel of the statute he authored. 
Senator Edmunds seemed to believe that federal courts could, or perhaps 
should, be able to review the actions of state courts, to determine “whether 
the State law had been followed, just as in many cases of federal judicial 
jurisdiction they so act, and yet take as the best proof of the State law the 
judgment of the highest State courts.”70  If this exercise of power was 
appropriate, Edmunds suggested that legislation “be made for a prompt 
review of the decisions of the State courts by the Supreme Court of the 
United States, so that before the counting of the Electoral votes every 
dispute concerning title to the office of Elector would be lawfully disposed 
of.”71 
In order to ensure enough time, Edmunds suggested holding the elections 
on the first of September and requiring the Electors to cast their votes on 
the first of January.72  Edmunds’ contemplation of a role for the U.S. 
Supreme Court does suggest some recognition on his part for a national 
institution to have the ultimate authority.  But insofar as he wanted to add 
the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction legislatively to the existing framework of 
the Twelfth Amendment rather than modify the Twelfth Amendment itself, 
Edmunds remained confused about who exercised final authority.  What if 
either the House or the Senate disagreed with the Supreme Court’s ruling?  
Or either the House or the Senate believed that the Supreme Court went 
beyond the scope of its statutory jurisdiction, or that this statutory 
jurisdiction was unconstitutional?  One could not give the Supreme Court 
final authority without also explicitly revoking that authority from the two 
Houses of Congress. 
Thus, it seems Edmunds believed in three distinct roles for three different 
types of bodies to determine the valid electoral vote.  First, the vote 
canvassing belonged to the state’s administrative mechanisms.  Second, the 
dispute resolution belonged to the designated state tribunals and possibly 
the federal judiciary for an abuse of discretion type review.  Third, the vote 
counting, after these disputes were resolved, was to be done by Congress, 
 
 70. Id. at 18. 
 71. Id. at 19. 
 72. Id. at 18. 
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but should be a rather mechanical exercise.  But 1877 showed the inability 
to keep this last stage merely mechanical. 
For the third function, Edmunds admitted that if one party controlled 
Congress, the decisions of the states and/or judiciary might be ignored.73  
Though less than ideal, he thought it was a danger in only the most extreme 
circumstances and his model would have reduced it.  However, in the ideal, 
Edmunds thought: 
If it were possible to find or to constitute one single tribunal, having final 
power to count the votes and declare the result after the States had, 
through their tribunals, disposed of disputes, being the farthest possible 
removed from the heat of political prejudice, and possessing from its 
character and constitution the general confidence of the country, the best 
method of ascertaining who had been elected President would be 
reached.74 
Here, “judicial tribunals are best calculated to hear and decide disputed 
questions of law and fact, although they may involve inquiries extending 
into the domain of politics and the decision of the fact of an election.”75  On 
this, however, Edmunds noted that a movement to give such a duty to the 
Supreme Court was defeated.76  Such proposals were made during and after 
1877, but they never seemed to garner much support.  Edmunds concluded, 
for unknown reasons, that there was not support in Congress for such a 
change, but predicted that at some time in the future, the function would be 
removed from the political branch and assigned to some sort of judicial 
tribunal.77  While Congress would adopt much of Edmunds’ vision, these 
latter two sentiments would fail to become part of the debate.  In other 
words, Edmunds’ best insights went unfulfilled.  He saw the need for a 
national adjudicatory tribunal but failed to press for it.  Nor does it appear 
that he pushed for replacing Congress as the vote counter, perhaps because 
this would have required constitutional amendment, something Edmunds 
sought to avoid. 
Whether Edmunds should be charged with a failure of vision or a failure 
of leadership, the bottom line is that he did not push for the kind of reforms 
that were necessary after 1877.  It is possible that Edmunds simply 
determined that systemic reform was impossible—still he recognized that it 
was needed and certainly could have made an effort. 
 
 73. Id. at 19 (“It may be thought that, in high party excitements, both when the two 
Houses of Congress are impressed with the same bias, and when they are in opposition, 
preliminary decisions will be disregarded . . . and thus there will still be danger.”). 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 19–20. 
 76. Id. at 20. 
 77. Id.  Legislators, he maintained, were ill-suited for such questions, “as they affect the 
right of the people at large, as well as private rights, and depend exclusively upon pre-
existing laws and events, and require for their solution only a discovery and declaration of 
them.” Id. 
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3.  Other Early Proposals 
The amendment to apportion the electoral votes into districts appears to 
have been the most serious proposal immediately following the 1876 
dispute because it came from the Committee.  However, the House did not 
vote on it, for reasons still undiscovered.78  In 1877, Senator William W. 
Eaton (D, CT) proposed an amendment that would have required the states 
to create election dispute tribunals.79  The governor in each state would 
appoint at least five people, with the advice of the state senate, to the 
tribunal at least one year before the presidential election.80 
The evenhandedness of this amendment would have seemed to depend 
entirely on the state governor’s party and state senate’s majority party.  The 
legislature would then direct the tribunal to hear cases of contested elections 
and the tribunal would determine and certify the case thirty days before the 
electors voted.81  Oddly, the amendment would not have bound Congress to 
the state’s decision.  Later proposed amendments simply empowered the 
joint convention of both Houses of Congress acting as one body to judge 
the electoral returns, or alternatively referred disputes to the Supreme Court, 
the highest state court, or Congress as a whole.82  As will be seen, parts of 
these proposed amendments would find their way, in part, into the ECA.  
No proposals for constitutional amendment were brought to a vote in the 
decade after 1876.83  Indeed, 
 
 78. HERMAN V. AMES, THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES DURING THE FIRST CENTURY OF ITS HISTORY 98 (1897). 
 79. Id. at 121. 
A tribunal for the decision of all contested issues arising in the choice of the 
electors of President and Vice-President shall be appointed in each State, in the 
manner following, to wit:  Not less than twelve months prior to the time fixed by 
law for the choice of electors, the governor of each State shall, by and with the 
advice and consent of the senate of the State, appoint not less than five persons 
learned in the law and otherwise duly qualified, to whom shall be referred, in such 
manner as the Legislature of the State shall direct, all cases of contested election 
arising in reference to electors of President and Vice-President.  And it shall be the 
duty of the tribunal so constituted to hear and determine every such contest, and to 
certify, thirty days at least before the day upon which the electors shall be called 
upon to give their votes, their decision therein to the proper returning officer or 
officers of the State, and to transmit an authenticated copy thereof, under the seal 
of the State, to the seat of Government of the United States, directed to the 
President of the Senate. 
  No person shall be eligible to the office of judge of elections who shall not have 
the qualifications required by law for judicial office in the State of which he is a 
citizen.  The term of office of the said judges of election shall expire upon the day 
fixed by law for the oath of office to be taken by the President and Vice-President 
elect of the United States, for the term ensuing after their appointment, and before 
entering upon the discharge of their duties they shall be sworn to a faithful 
performance of the same. 
6 CONG. REC. 415 (1877). 
 80. AMES, supra note 78, at 121. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 115–16. 
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[t]he fact that it was impossible to secure the indorsement [sic] of any one 
of the plans proposed in the years succeeding the contested election of 
1876 by even one branch of Congress indicates that the adoption of a new 
system of electing the Chief Magistrate is improbable before the present 
method of amending the Constitution is itself changed.84 
This point, that amending the Constitution is incredibly difficult, plays a 
significant role in framing the entire approach to reform.  Senator Edmunds 
recognized this difficulty in his law review article, as he advocated 
legislating within the confines of the Constitution’s text, rather than 
changing the text.  With members of Congress resigned to the idea that a 
constitutional amendment was an impossible task, creative proposals to the 
problem were limited to any legislative solution that was consistent with the 
Twelfth Amendment. 
Arguably, however, these members of Congress were too quick to 
abandon the idea of a constitutional amendment, even recognizing its great 
difficulty.  After all, there have been other constitutional amendments 
concerning presidential elections and transitions:  the Twelfth itself, the 
Twentieth, and the Twenty-Fifth.  Moreover, in 1934 Senator George 
Norris came two votes shy in the Senate of sending an additional 
amendment to the states.85  Therefore, had there been a concerted effort to 
adopt a well-tailored amendment dealing with the problem of disputed 
presidential ballots, it could have mustered enough support at some point 
during the decade between 1877 and 1887. 
B.  Forty-Sixth Congress 1880:  The Democrats Control Both Houses 
For the first time in decades, Democrats controlled both Houses of 
Congress in 1880.  It seems clear from the debates that the Democrats 
harbored resentment over the Hayes-Tilden dispute and perceived 
Republican abuse under the Twenty-Second Joint Rule in the 1860s.  This 
resentment played a significant role in the debate as the Democrats went 
back to investigate the 1876 election, and their main proposal was another 
joint rule.  Even though the Democrats chafed under the Republican use of 
the earlier joint rule, the Democrats sought payback rather than fair-minded 
reform.  Despite the Democratic control of both Houses, however, the 46th 
Congress was unable to enact a rule or piece of legislation, which 
demonstrates the diversity of opinions on this subject. 
1.  The Senate Considers a Joint Rule or Bill for the Electoral Count 
On May 6, 1880, Senator John Tyler Morgan (D, AL) introduced a joint 
rule, Senate Res. 1712, for the counting of electoral votes.86  The proposal 
required at least two Senators and three House members to sign any 
 
 84. Id. at 113. 
 85. Caitlyn Nestleroth, Senator George W. Norris’s 1934 Constitutional Amendment 
Relating to Disputed Presidential Elections (May 14, 2010) (paper on file with author); see 
also 78 Cong. Rec. 9245 (1934).   
 86. 10 CONG. REC. 3547 (1880). 
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objection to votes.87  If there was a valid objection to a state’s vote the two 
Houses were to split and consider the objection separately, until both 
Houses resolved the objections, at which time they were to meet again.88  If 
only one list of votes was received from a state, the rule required both 
Houses to concur in order to reject the votes.89  However, 
[i]f more than one list of votes of electors from any State, or paper 
purporting to be such list, has been submitted to each House for its 
decision upon objections made thereto, and it shall appear that the Houses 
have not concurred in receiving either of said lists, they shall each be 
declared by the President of the Senate, in the presence of the Senate and 
House of Representatives, as being rejected; and no list of votes of 
electors so rejected shall be afterward read in the presence of the two 
Houses except for information.90 
Thus, in the event of multiple returns, both Houses would have to concur to 
accept the returns.  The proposal also provided for a separate opportunity to 
challenge electors or their individual votes.  In the event of this challenge, 
the Houses would again separate to consider the objections, but no vote 
would be rejected unless both Houses concurred.91  The Bill was referred to 
the Special Committee on the Elections of President and Vice-President, 
which Senator Morgan chaired.92 
On May 20, 1880, Senator Morgan reported back to say that the Bill was 
postponed indefinitely.93  On May 21, Senator Morgan moved to have the 
joint rule considered by the Senate and the motion was agreed to.94  The 
next day, the proposed rule was read again and the only significant change 
to the initial proposal was to remove the separate procedure for considering 
objections to the electors.95 
Senator Morgan went on to explain the rationale behind the proposed 
rule, starting with the legislative power to create such a rule.  He explained 
that the statutes already passed by Congress likely exhausted the extent to 
 
 87. Id. at 3654. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id.  Senator John Tyler Morgan made clear that his intent was to move away from 
the previous Twenty-Second Joint Rule that allowed either of the two Houses to reject the 
votes of a state far too easily in a way that violated the Constitution. Id. at 3655. 
 90. Id. at 3052.  It appears that Senator Morgan thought that there was no alternative to 
rejecting all slates if both Houses disagreed.  He believed the idea that Congress could 
compel a state to follow a certain procedure and then give presumptive approval to the 
certificate that resulted from that procedure to be an affront to the power of the states.  The 
possibility of total disenfranchisement was as far as Senator Morgan would go to incentivize 
the states to resolve their disputes. Id. at 3656.   
 91. Id. at 3052. 
 92. Id.; see also JOINT RULE FOR COUNTING THE VOTES OF ELECTORS OF PRESIDENT AND 
VICE-PRESIDENT, SENATE MISC. DOC. NO. 90 (1880).  
 93. 10 CONG. REC. at 3547. 
 94. Id. at 3608.  The following day, Senator Morgan noted that this was a strict party 
line vote. Id. at 3653.  Removing the provision on challenging electors was likely because 
another bill, S. 1687, was introduced to deal with this directly. Id. at 3656.  This bill would 
have made it a crime for anyone ineligible to be an elector, or improperly assuming the role 
of an elector, to cast a vote. Id. 
 95. Id. at 3652–53. 
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which Congress was authorized to legislate in regard to the presidential 
election.96  Once the electoral certificates reached the two Houses of 
Congress, this legislative power ended and “the jurisdiction of the Senate 
and House of Representatives to count the votes and ascertain the persons 
elected takes full effect.”97  Senator Morgan suggested that many believed 
Congress could go no further in controlling the count “without invading the 
constitutional jurisdiction of this great tribunal.”98  Furthermore, Senator 
Morgan noted that other than the Electoral Commission Act and perhaps the 
Twenty-Second Joint Rule, Congress had been unwilling to use legislation 
to control its discretionary exercise of the right to count votes.99 
Senator Morgan also noted that Abraham Lincoln signed the joint 
resolution but included a statement maintaining he had no right to interfere 
in the counting of electoral votes under the Twelfth Amendment and that he 
had no room to veto the resolution even if he so desired.100  This rejection 
of the power of Congress to regulate the counting of the vote by legislation 
meant that they could only do so by “concurrent agreement” or by 
constitutional amendment.101  Until such an amendment was adopted, 
Senator Morgan maintained that Congress must use the joint rules, even 
though those rules might only be “binding as a matter of comity between 
the two Houses.”102  It was, therefore, Congress’s duty, “in advance of 
another election, to adopt some rules that will be just to all parties at all 
times and under all circumstances, as far as this may be attainable.”103 
But why did Senator Morgan not entertain the possibility of a 
constitutional amendment for the sake of posterity, and not just a joint rule 
for the next election?  His failure to do so showed a lack of statesmanship.  
 
 96. Id. at 3653.  Of course, the fact that a Republican—“His Fraudulency Hayes” no 
less—was in the White House at the time would have created a strong incentive for the 
Democrats in Congress to use the joint rule, rather than legislation, approach to adopt their 
preferred procedures for counting Electoral College votes. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id.  In regard to that joint resolution, Senator Morgan noted that the prevailing 
opinion was that the motivation to disenfranchise and punish certain southern states caused 
Congress to abuse its power. Id.  For an explanation of the Twenty-second joint rule, see 
supra n. 37.  Furthermore, Senator Morgan noted that Congress had adopted twenty-two 
such joint rules but never submitted one to the President. 10 CONG. REC. at 3663.  Indeed, he 
noted, the question of presentment to the President was expressly raised and decided in the 
negative when the first joint rule was adopted. Id. 
 100. Id. at 3654.  Indeed, Lincoln actually held on to the resolution until the votes had 
been counted in favor of his election and then signed it. Id.  Senator Morgan’s concern 
makes sense; as he later noted, there should be “great deal of hesitancy, and I confess in 
some instances with alarm, upon intrusting [sic] to the President of the United States the 
power to participate in legislation which might affect the result of the count in which he was 
personally interested.” Id. at 3659  Likewise, if Congress desired to change the law, the 
president could veto the measure if he decided it was not in his interest or simply disagreed 
with it. Id. 
 101. Id. at 3654. 
 102. Id.  Senator Roscoe Conkling (R, NY) argued that the rule should have a provision 
requiring that it could not be withdrawn except by concurrent vetoes of both houses, 
otherwise it would have no permanence in the event of political shifts in Congress. Id. at 
3661. 
 103. Id. at 3654. 
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Like the Democrats in 1804, who asserted their unilateral power to adopt 
the Twelfth Amendment over the objections of the Federalist Party, 104 the 
Democrats of 1880 could have pushed forward their vision of how to 
resolve a disputed presidential election, or sought some form of 
accommodation with Republicans in order to assure necessary ratification 
of an amendment. 
Senator Morgan argued that the joint session certainly had the power to 
determine whether the “power of appointment has been constitutionally and 
lawfully exercised,” but in the event that a state only returned one 
certificate, the requirement that both Houses concur in order to reject the 
certificate embraced the idea that they should presume that the certificate 
received was legitimate.105  The same presumption did not apply when a 
state submitted multiple certificates.106 
Senator Morgan’s critiques of using a traditional piece of legislation to 
regulate the electoral count and compelling the states to create procedures 
that would give their returns a presumption of validity were leveled directly 
at Senate Bill 1485, introduced by Senator Edmunds.107  This Bill was in 
fact the precursor to the Electoral Count Act.  For instance, it gave 
presumptive approval to any determination of an election controversy made 
pursuant to the preexisting laws of a state.108  Senator Edmunds’ Bill 
required only one Senator and House member to sign each objection to an 
electoral vote.109  Upon receiving the objections for a specific state, each 
House was to withdraw and consider the objections.110 
The proposed Bill also had particular rules that restricted the discretion of 
the two Houses to reject votes.  For instance, if only one set of returns was 
received from a state, rejection of those returns required the affirmative 
votes of both Houses.111  In the case of two or more sets of votes, only 
those votes found to be “regularly given by the electors” determined by the 
appropriate tribunal under preexisting state law could be counted.112  In the 
 
 104. See infra note 121. 
 105. 10 Cong. Rec. at 3655 (“The theory of the rule now presented is that the States first 
pass judgment upon the fact of the appointment of electors and upon the validity of the votes 
cast by them so far, at least, as the question of their validity depends upon the laws of the 
States; and unless the Houses shall concur in overruling that decision, it shall stand.”). 
 106. Id. 
 107. For the full text of the bill, see id. at 3656-57. 
 108. Id. at 3656. 
That each State may, pursuant to its laws existing on the day fixed for the 
appointment of the electors, try and determine before the time fixed for the 
meeting of the electors any controversy concerning their appointment, or the 
appointment of any of them.  Every such determination made pursuant to such law 
so existing on said day, and made prior to the said time of meeting of the electors, 
shall be conclusive evidence of the lawful title of the electors who shall have been 
so determined to have been appointed, and shall govern in the counting of the 
electoral votes as provided in the Constitution, and as hereinafter regulated. 
Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id.  This is the same as Senator Morgan’s joint rule. 
 112. Id. 
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case of a dispute of more than one state tribunal, the two Houses would 
have to concur as to which electors and tribunal were “authorized by [the 
state’s] laws.”113  If no state tribunal was to pass judgment on multiple 
slates of electors then the two Houses would have to concurrently decide 
“the lawful votes of the legally appointed electors of such State.”114  
Ultimately, Senator Edmunds maintained that his Bill restricted the ability 
of the joint session to pass judgment upon a state’s selection of electors in a 
way that was most faithful to the Constitution.115 
Senator Morgan was quick to note that the two proposals contained many 
similarities.  In addition to objecting to the use of a bill, his primary critique 
was leveled at giving presumptive validity to a decision by a state’s highest 
tribunal.  Senator Morgan argued that this provision impermissibly 
restricted the constitutional power of the two Houses to judge the votes of a 
state.116  As Senator Morgan noted, the joint session, which he called the 
election tribunal, was a peculiar body in the Constitution: 
It is not a congress met together; it is not a joint assemblage of the two 
Houses in which there is any general power to be exercised by them in the 
presence of each other, but it is the meeting of two distinct constitutional 
bodies entrusted with a distinct constitutional jurisdiction.  The very 
essence of the jurisdiction that they can exercise implies necessarily that 
they must have the full and unlimited power of deciding according to their 
own enlightened discretion and judgment as to what is proper to be done 
under the Constitution and laws of the United States . . . .117 
Furthermore, he argued, if Senator Edmunds was correct and the two 
Houses could be required to accept the final judgment of a state on this 
matter, it is because the Constitution must entrust that power to the 
states.118  Instead, Senator Edmunds’ proposal would allow the power to be 
impermissibly shared between the states and the two Houses of 
Congress.119 
Senator Edmunds responded to Senator Morgan’s assertion that the use 
of traditional legislation was inappropriate by noting that as early as 1800, 
when Congress considered creating a Grand Committee120 for counting 
electoral votes, both Houses passed legislation in support of the proposal.121  
 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 3697 (“I have always maintained since I have maintained anything about it, 
that the Congress of the United States has not a right in any form to draw into question the 
action of a State, and that when the counting power, be it large or little, or wherever it may 
be . . . has ascertained that those are the official papers of the State, comes to act it has no 
mission of decision or discretion or consideration at all; that its duty is absolutely 
ministerial.”). 
 116. Id. at 3658–59. 
 117. Id. at 3659. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. The Grand Committee proposal of 1800 would have appointed six members of each 
House of Congress and the Chief Justice to resolve election disputes. See generally, Colvin 
& Foley, supra note 3, at 486–88. 
 121. 10 CONG. REC. at 3662 (also noting an attempt to do the same in 1824). 
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The source of power to legislate in the area, according to Senator Edmunds, 
came from the Necessary and Proper Clause.122  Furthermore, a traditional 
piece of legislation was desirable because it was permanent in nature and 
less vulnerable to abuse in the event of one-party control of Congress.123  
Senator Morgan responded by noting that neither Bill in 1800was adopted 
by both Houses.  He also criticized the specificity that Senator Edmunds’ 
Bill included, which, he argued, would tend to cause Congress to legislate 
with more and more detail on the subject.124  Of course in the background 
of this debate must have been the fact that the President was a Republican.  
The Democrats could pass a joint rule without Republican support or the 
President’s signature.  A piece of legislation would require some level of 
compromise in order to gain President Hayes’ signature. 
The Senate again took up debate of Senator Morgan’s concurrent 
resolution ten days later on May 24, 1880.125  Senator Henry M. Teller (R, 
CO), who was also on the Committee, started the debate by voicing his 
objections to the plan.126  Senator Teller began by acknowledging that the 
Senate might be “acting under a pressing necessity, [and] under a demand 
made by the people for some provision for counting the electoral vote” but 
this Bill was a purely temporary measure, likely to survive only one 
electoral count.127 
Worse still, Senator Teller saw no reason either House could abandon the 
rule either before or during the electoral count.128  Senator Teller also 
objected that the resolution gave Congress too much power, authorizing the 
two Houses “to inquire whether the electors had been or had not been 
elected in the manner provided by the various State Legislatures.”129  But 
 
 122. Id. at 3694. 
 123. Id. at 3695.  By contrast, a joint rule, “instead of providing . . . for a rule of law 
which certainly exercises some constraint upon Senators and members of Congress as well 
as other people, [Senator Morgan] propose[s] to decline to have a law at all, but propose[s] 
to leave it to the entirely unregulated, unbridled, and undirected will of what may happen to 
be the majority on that occasion, and in the case of a double return to say that you will take 
neither unless both Houses can agree to take one or the other.  That would have the effect to 
throw out the vote of the particular State on this division.” Id. 
 124. Id. at 3662 (“Once that you get this subject open to legislative action and put it under 
the control of the legislative power of Congress you open a wide gap . . . .”). 
 125. Id. at 3682. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 3683.  Senator Henry M. Teller was an absolutist on this question. (“The 
Constitution . . . submitted this whole question to the State, having reserved nothing to 
Congress except the power to appoint the time at which these men should be appointed and 
the time at which they should cast their votes, the authority, it seems to me, to examine and 
determine whether the State has elected them in the manner that we think they ought to have 
been elected cannot be found anywhere in the Constitution.”). Id.  Senator Teller went so far 
as to insist that Congress could not even pass judgment on whether an elector was 
constitutionally ineligible. Id.  Despite this, Senator Teller did seem to leave open the idea 
that Congress could pass judgment on the actions of state officials if they acted outside “the 
ordinary forms of law.” Id.  Furthermore, seemingly contradicting himself, Senator Teller 
thought it possible that Congress could pass a law to this effect. Id.  It is difficult to 
understand how this might solve the constitutional problems posed by passing judgment on 
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what if a state submits multiple returns?  In that case Senator Teller’s 
absolutist position unraveled, and he acknowledged that the two Houses 
could determine the “one true return.”130  Senator Teller did not explain 
how the two Houses would venture to determine the honest return. 
Senator John J. Ingalls (R, KS) rose to explain the sorts of “emergencies” 
that could arise during the electoral count:  (1) a certificate might be 
withheld or defective, (2) one or more electors might be constitutionally 
ineligible, (3) the electors might cast their votes for ineligible candidates, 
(4) a state might not be eligible to cast votes, (5) there might be multiple 
returns from a single state, and (6) no person might receive a majority of the 
votes.131  Despite all of these problems, Senator Ingalls noted that the 
Constitution only provided a solution for the sixth issue, no candidate 
receiving a majority of the votes.132  In this case, of course, the vote would 
be shifted to the House of Representatives, where the representation from 
each state would have a single vote.133  Senator Ingalls maintained that by 
analogy, this method was the only method the Constitution provided to 
resolve these sorts of emergencies and should be employed in the five other 
emergencies.134  Senator Ingalls offered an amendment to the joint rule to 
this effect.135 
Senators Edmunds and Morgan again debated the virtues of enacting a 
statute or joint rule.136  Senator Morgan suggested the statute would be no 
more compulsory than a rule and that there would be no way to force 
 
the electoral votes, unless perhaps he thought it would be authorized by the Necessary and 
Proper Clause. 
 130. Id.  Ultimately, Senator Teller’s absolutist stance only applied if there was a single 
return. Id.  Senator Teller’s argument would have been stronger if he explained why 
Congress could pick between two returns but not disqualify a constitutionally ineligible 
elector. 
 131. Id. at 3685. 
 132. Id. 
 133. U.S. CONST. amend. XII. 
 134. 10 CONG. REC. at 3685–86.  Thus, if a state returned two rival certificates, the 
question would be turned over to the House voting by state representation.  Senator John J. 
Ingalls maintained that this was most faithful to the Constitution in two ways.  First, the 
Framers envisioned the method to resolve one of the types of emergencies. Id.  Second, this 
method looked the most like the Electoral College itself, so it would remain faithful to that 
institution and the rights of the states. Id.  The Senate, he argued, would play no role in the 
matter. Id. at 3686. 
 135. Id. at 3686.  Senator Ingalls also stressed that he voted against the electoral 
commission bill in 1877 and was of the opinion that constitutional amendment was the only 
appropriate method for changing the operation of electoral count. Id. at 3685 (“It appears 
inappropriate that a President should have any connection whatever with legislation bearing 
upon a subject so vital and important to himself.  It should be, in my judgment, by an 
amendment to the Constitution.”).  However, if a statute should be passed, Senator Ingalls 
argued that they should act quickly before the politics of the next election affected their 
ability to do so in a nonpartisan fashion. Id.  Senator Ingalls’ argument was opposed most 
strongly by Senator Conkling, despite the fact that he did not plan to vote for the rule. Id. at 
3686–87.  Senator Conkling’s opposition was grounded in his belief that partisan bias would 
govern results in a close election with one-party control of Congress. Id. at 3689.  Finding no 
support, Senator Ingalls withdrew the amendment. Id. at 3694. 
 136. Id. at 3699–700. 
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Congress to abide by it if Congress chose to ignore it.137  Senator Edmunds 
replied that he felt the political ramifications of ignoring the statute were 
too great, for instance, if the statute plainly required the joint session to 
accept any decision made by a state tribunal about the correct electors, the 
joint session would feel compelled to do so.138 
Ultimately, Senator Edmunds offered an amendment substituting Senator 
Morgan’s resolution with his proposal.139  The amendment was rejected 
thirteen to twenty-seven.140  Senator Edmunds then offered an amendment 
to Senator Morgan’s resolution that gave conclusive status to any 
determination about an election dispute made by a state tribunal pursuant to 
laws existing prior to the meeting of the electors.141  This amendment was 
rejected fourteen to twenty-five.142  The Senate considered Senator 
Morgan’s resolution without any amendments and the resolution passed 
twenty-five to fourteen.143 
2.  The House Considers the Joint Rule 
The House took up consideration of the resolution on June 10, 1880.144  
The Chairman of the Committee on the Electoral Count, Representative 
George A. Bicknell (D, IN) introduced the Bill, noting that the whole 
committee had considered and agreed upon the resolution.145  
Representative Bicknell started by stating that the Necessary and Proper 
Clause empowered Congress to “provide legislation necessary and proper to 
carry into effect the powers of the two Houses for ascertaining and 
declaring the result of the election.”146  Representative Bicknell did 
acknowledge what he considered to be the weakness of the resolution, its 
form as a joint rule rather than legislation.147  In his mind, the Constitution 
demanded legislation to carry into execution constitutional provisions and 
thus, a joint rule is nothing more than “mere make-shift, a temporary 
expedient” because “it binds nobody.”148  Bicknell was unclear about the 
reason the Senate insisted on a joint rule, but he had several ideas.  First, he 
suggested that it might be revenge for the Republican use of the Twenty-
 
 137. Id. at 3699. 
 138. Id. at 3700. 
 139. Id. at 3701. 
 140. Id. at 3703.  Thirty-six senators were absent. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 3704. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 4386. 
 145. Id.  There was no formal written report and motions to refer the bill back to the 
committee to produce a report were rejected. Id. at 4387. 
 146. Id. at 4387.  Additionally, he noted, the current state of the law was inadequate. Id. 
(“[The statutes] fail to declare who shall count the electoral vote, they fail to declare who 
shall determine what are votes proper to be counted, and they make no provision whatever 
for the determination of contested elections.”). 
 147. Id. at 4388. 
 148. Id. (“Either House adopting it to-day may abandon it to-morrow.  It carries no moral 
force with it.”). 
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Second Joint Rule.149  Representative Bicknell responded to this 
suggestion, “I submit that it is not our part to follow republican examples; 
we never gained anything by it.  Our business is to do right and satisfy our 
constituents.”150  Representative John Van Voorhis (R, NY) was even 
sharper in his attribution of partisanship, describing the joint rule as “a 
convenient and easy method to enable the Democratic Party to obtain the 
Presidency, whether its candidate is elected or not.”151 
The other possible reason why the Democrats in the Senate insisted on a 
joint rule was simply that passing a traditional bill was impossible.  But 
Representative Bicknell argued that this should not be a deterrent either.152  
Despite his concerns, Representative Bicknell gave his support to the joint 
rule because it addressed the “emergency”153 and might give momentum to 
an eventual piece of legislation.154 
The objections to the rule were generally similar to those in the Senate.  
For instance, Representative Thomas Updegraff (R, IA) voiced several 
objections.  First, he believed that the power to count rested with the 
President of the Senate and could only be altered by constitutional 
amendment.155  Second, the joint rule violated Article 2, Section 1 of the 
Constitution, giving state legislatures the power to appoint the electors.156  
And third, the passage of the rule would only make matters and confusion 
 
 149. Id. Indeed, Representative Eppa Hunton (D, VA) argued that the Republicans were 
hypocritical for opposing this rule on the grounds that they approved of the Twenty-Second 
Joint Rule. Id. at 4494 (“Now, what do my friends on the other side think of this rule in 
regard to violating State rights if their party approved the late twenty-second joint rule?”).  
Representative Harry White (R, PA) responded by simply saying it “was a bad rule.” Id.  
 150. Id. at 4388. 
 151. Id. at 4487. 
 152. Id. at 4388 (“The answer to this is that, if we are right, the possibility of defeat ought 
not deter us, the difficulties in the way ought not to frighten us.  If it be suggested that some 
constitutional scruples may defeat the proposed law, I submit that a joint rule contravening 
the Constitution is no better, nay, it is worse than a doubtful law; it is accomplishing by 
indirection what you dare not openly undertake.  If it be suggested that there is danger of a 
veto from the President, the answer is, we are bound to perform our duty without reference 
to a possible failure of duty elsewhere.”). 
 153. Id.  Representative George A. Bicknell also referred to the defects of the Twelfth 
Amendment. See id. for his take on the various opinions of the Twelfth Amendment. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. at 4389; see also id. at 4501–02 (argument by Representative Lucien B. Caswell 
(R, WI) that this rule and the electoral commission bill were unconstitutional).  Other 
Republicans stuck with the argument that legislation was necessary.  For example, 
Representative White maintained that there was no doubt that Congress could legislate on 
the matter, pointing to the Electoral Commission and participation by five Supreme Court 
justices as the highest precedent in this regard. Id. at 4500. 
 156. Id. at 4389.  Additionally, Representative Thomas Updegraff maintained that the 
constitutional text and structure gave no suggestion that Congress should have any power to 
legislate in the area of the electoral count; rather, all such power was granted to the states. Id. 
at 4390.  The fact that under the proposed joint rule a single House could stifle the voice of a 
state caused issue as well. Id. at 4391.  Representative John Van Voorhis (R, NY) was 
generally of the same opinion.  He believed that all disputes and questions could only be 
answered and settled at the state level.  If two certificates were received, then it was up to the 
President of the Senate, and only the President of the Senate, to look to see which certificate 
was made in the mode prescribed by the state legislature. Id. at 4488. 
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worse.157  Additionally, Representative Updegraff argued that the power 
created by the resolution was “unmistakably judicial and not legislative” 
and it was wrong to assign such power to a legislative body.158  Another 
objection, from Representative Van Voorhis, was that allowing Congress to 
play an active role in the electoral count would violate separation of powers 
because it would take power from the President of the Senate (the Vice 
President) and give Congress too much power in determining who will be 
the next President.159 
Representative William Lounsbery (D, NY) made appeals to the urgency 
of the matter.  It was only the following winter of 1881 during which the 
joint session would count the electoral votes.  If they did not pass a 
resolution, there would be no rule by which to guide the count and the 
country might fall again to political division.160  Representative Harry 
White (R, PA) doubted the sincerity of the Democrats’ sense of urgency.  
He argued that it was not without reason that they only pursued this joint 
rule at the very end of the session, suggesting that the Democrats sought to 
sneak one by the other party or the American people.161  Indeed, he pointed 
out, there had been ample opportunity for the House to deal with the issue 
since 1876 but there seemed to be no sense of urgency then.162 
Representative Eppa Hunton (VA, D) took issue with the idea that this 
rule was an invasion upon the power of the states to appoint the electors.  
Representative Hunton argued that first, the right to select electors is not an 
original power, but rather one conferred upon the states by the 
Constitution.163  This right, however, was not absolute, because it was not 
an interest in each state individually, but all the states together.164  In other 
 
 157. Id. at 4389. 
 158. Id. at 4393. 
 159. Id. at 4490–91. 
 160. Id. at 4401 (“[T]he two Houses of Congress will come together next winter, as the 
Constitution says they shall come, without any light or guide except their conscience and 
their purpose at the time when they have to act[.]  Do they not know that when great interests 
are at stake, when two, three, or perhaps more parties in this country shall have been in a 
struggle hot and exciting, the blood not yet cooled, the results not yet determined, the dispute 
still active in the public minds in all the States—do not gentlemen know the great danger 
which will hang over us if we now refuse to act?”).  Similar appeals were made by 
Representative Hunton. Id. at 4492 (“The question presented to this House is one of the 
deepest importance, because in my opinion if ever this country is disrupted and the 
Government broken up it will be on the occasion of a contested presidential election.”); id. at 
4494. (“[T]he closing hours of this session are approaching, and we thought something must 
be done to avert the disaster, possibly war, next year, in the count of the votes for 
President . . . .”). 
 161. Id. at 4491 (“The American people are now within five months of another 
presidential election, with the possibilities of all the angry excitements of the past upon 
them, and yet no deliberate enactments have been considered by this House nor by this 
Congress providing suitable remedies against the dangerous perils from the uncertainties and 
disputes about electoral counts.  Now, here in the closing hours of the session a remedy, a 
weak, unsatisfactory, unconstitutional remedy, is proposed in the form of a mere legislative 
rule.”). 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. at 4492. 
 164. Id. 
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words, in 1876, “[n]ot only was Louisiana interested to have her true vote 
counted and to have her legally appointed electors certify their votes here 
and their votes counted, but every one of the thirty-eight States . . . had the 
same interest in the question.”165  Debate over the resolution continued until 
June 14, at which point the Democrats were unable to form a quorum in 
order to vote to pass the resolution.166  Having reached the end of the 
session, Representative Bicknell relented and made a motion that the 
resolution be postponed until December.167 
3.  The Senate Revisits the Question in December 1880 and Amends the 
Plan 
The presidential election in November 1880, between Republican James 
Garfield and Democrat Winfield S. Hancock, was remarkably close, with 
the closest popular vote margin ever, less than 10,000 votes, or less than 0.1 
percent of the total.168  The electoral vote margin was 214–155, but 
Garfield won the 35 electoral votes in New York by a relatively close 
margin, 20,000 votes out of 1.1 million votes cast, enough to swing the 
entire election.169  Had Hancock won New York, he would have had an 
Electoral College majority of 190–179. 
The Democrats alleged fraud in the state, with suggestions that 
Republicans had brought in voters from neighboring states and that 5,000 
Democratic ballots were dumped into the Hudson River.170 Some 
Democratic leaders argued that Hancock should contest the election; he 
waited six days to concede, deciding it was not worth the possible unrest.171  
Republicans had allegations of their own, including fraud in California and 
“fraud, violence and intimidation” in parts of the South in states that went 
for Hancock.172  Despite the closeness of the election, however, it does not 
appear from the debates that it played much of a role in cajoling Congress 
to act. 
 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. at 4540.  House Republicans were refusing to vote. Id. 
 167. Id.  The motion passed ninety to seventy-five. Id. at 4541.  In the Senate, Senator 
Morgan offered a resolution to note that “the President of the Senate is not invested by the 
Constitution of the United States with the right to count the votes of electors” in response to 
the House’s inability to consider the joint rule. Id. at 4558.  The resolution could not be 
considered without unanimous consent and Senator Ingalls. Id. 
 168. KENNETH D. ACKERMAN, DARK HORSE:  THE SURPRISE ELECTION AND POLITICAL 
MURDER OF PRESIDENT JAMES A. GARFIELD  220 (2003). 
 169. Id. at 221. 
 170. HERBERT J. CLANCY, THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 1880, at 243–44 (1958).  
 171. EDWARD B. FOLEY, BOOK ON DISPUTED ELECTIONS (forthcoming, draft on file). 
 172. ACKERMAN, supra note 168, at 221.  Garfield lost California by less than 150 votes 
out of more than 160,000 cast.  His loss was blamed on the publishing of a fake letter, 
attributed to him, which suggested supported continued Chinese immigration, which was 
detrimental to California workers. Id. at 218, 221.  If New York had flipped to Winfield S. 
Hancock, Garfield would have only needed to flip a state with six electoral votes to regain 
the lead, the number that California had that year.  In fact, California was so close that year 
that one of Garfield’s electors actually polled higher than one of Hancock’s, causing 
California to split its Electoral College vote 5–1. See JEROME D. LEVIN, PRESIDENTIAL 
ELECTIONS, 1789–2000, at 158 (2002). 
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On December 22, Senator Morgan reintroduced the resolution to have the 
Senate vote on it or to have it referred back to the committee.173  Senators 
Morgan and Edmunds proceeded to rehash much of their debate from the 
past summer.174  The only portion perhaps worth mentioning is that Senator 
Edmunds insisted that at this point there was no real urgency on the matter 
because it was his belief that James Garfield was duly elected President and 
there would be no issues during the electoral count.175  Senator Morgan 
responded that a regulation for the conduct of the count was still needed and 
that there might be some question about the vote of Georgia.176  Georgia’s 
electors cast their votes on the incorrect day.  Regardless, Senator Edmunds 
moved that the Senate proceed to the consideration of other business and 
the Senate agreed to the motion.177 
On January 29, 1881, Senator Ingalls introduced a resolution requesting 
the presences of both Houses for the purpose of counting the electoral vote.  
The resolution was similar in form to the typical electoral count resolution, 
providing for a date and time and purpose for the meeting, with little 
guidance as far as procedure.178  Senator Thomas F. Bayard (D, DE) made a 
motion to refer the resolution to the Select Committee on the Electoral 
Count.179  The Republicans argued that this was unnecessary since the 
resolution was the same in form to most prior resolutions and there were 
only eight legislative days until the joint session, so it was unlikely anything 
more specific could be agreed on.180  Senator Morgan argued that he did not 
desire to have the joint session and to see a dispute arise without a rule 
established in advance of the dispute, again referring to a possible issue 
with the state of Georgia.181  Once again, even over this relatively simple 
issue, the debate broke along partisan lines and the resolution was referred 
to the committee twenty-nine to eighteen.182 
Senator Morgan reported back to the full Senate with the resolution and 
an amendment on February 1.183  The amendment added a section to deal 
with any potential votes of electors that “have been given on a day other 
than that fixed for casting such votes by act of Congress.”184  This took the 
form of a few prior joint rules in the event that the vote count would be 
stated in two hypothetical totals:  if the votes had counted, or if they had 
 
 173. 11 CONG. REC. 312 (1880). 
 174. Id. at 312–17. 
 175. Id. at 317. 
 176. Id.  If Hancock had won New York, and Georgia’s votes had been thrown out, there 
would have been a question whether Hancock had won “a majority of the whole number of 
electors appointed,” as required by the Twelfth Amendment. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. at 1020–21. 
 179. Id. at 1021. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. at 1022 (“It is therefore proper, it seems to me, that this committee should take 
into consideration at least . . . [the] questions that may arise in reference to the counting of 
the votes of the different States.”). 
 182. Id. at 1023. 
 183. Id. at 1090. 
 184. Id. 
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not.185  Senator Morgan admitted that James Garfield had won the 
Presidency and expressed his confidence that the electoral count would be 
orderly and peaceful.186  As such, he felt it was necessary to adopt this 
solution in order to avoid any issue about Georgia’s vote.187 
Senator Edmunds, Senator Morgan’s antagonist much of the previous 
session, agreed with the approach.188  Despite that, there was still some 
opposition.  Senator George F. Hoar (R, MA)189, recognizing that Congress 
had adopted this approach in the past, expressed his concern that this was 
the equivalent to failing in their constitutional duty, that there would in fact 
be no single electoral count.190  Senator Benjamin Harvey Hill, from 
Georgia attributed his state’s failure to cast the votes on the correct day to a 
mere accident, a misunderstanding as to which day would be the first 
Wednesday in December.191  Despite this, and the fact that he was certain 
that the votes still reflected the election in Georgia, Senator Hill argued that 
the votes should be excluded on the grounds that this was what the 
Constitution and statute required and to send a message to states so they 
know the rule will be enforced.192 
The House considered the Senate’s joint resolution on February 5 and the 
debate included basically the same points as those made in the Senate.  
Despite these strong opinions, the resolution passed the House, 160–77.193  
 
 185. Id. 
Were the votes of electors cast on the ___ day of ___, 1880, to be counted, the 
result would be A B for President of the United States ___ votes, and for C D for 
President of the United States ___ votes; if not counted the result would be for A B 
for President of the United States ___ votes, and for C D for President of the 
United States ___ votes, but in either event ___ is elected President of the United 
States. 
 186. Id. at 1130. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. (“I have no disposition to discuss or criticise the second part of the amendment 
recommended by the committee, in respect of, as it is understood, the State of Georgia.”).  
Likewise, Senator Ingalls, who opposed Senator Morgan’s efforts to create a joint rule, 
agreed with the approach. Id. at 1133. 
 189. As will be seen, along with Senator Edmunds, Senator George F. Hoar, Republican 
from Massachusetts, was one of the main advocates of the ECA in the Senate.  He was 
Chairman of the Committee on Privileges and Elections for more than ten years during this 
period. 2 GEORGE F. HOAR, AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF SEVENTY YEARS 100 (1903).  Remarkably, 
neither his autobiography nor biography contains a single mention of the bill. Id.; see also 
FREDERICK H. GILLETT, GEORGE FRISBIE HOAR (1934).  
 190. 11 CONG. REC. at 1131: 
I deemed it my duty to put on record my protest and my conviction that the 
Congress of the United States has got over the temporary danger and temporary 
difficulty, not in a constitutional way, by providing by law as it ought to have done 
at the time of the last election, a method of performing this constitutional function 
of counting the vote, but by refusing to perform the one clearest and most 
imperative duty which rests upon somebody, under the Constitution, to count the 
vote. 
 191. Id. at 1133. 
 192. Id. at 1133–34 (“[T]he States ought all to be notified that if they fail to cast their vote 
in the manner, and especially at the time, prescribed by the law of Congress, the vote will not 
be counted . . . .”). 
 193. Id. at 1262.  Democrats voted in favor of the resolution, 115-6.  Thirty-five 
Republicans voted for it while sixty-seven voted against it.  
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The electoral vote count was performed according to the resolution on 
February 9, declaring the results in two alternatives, with and without 
Georgia’s electoral votes.194 
Thus, the country and Congress barely dodged another bullet in 1880.  
Even so, this fact coupled with the still-recent experience of the election of 
1876 was insufficient to prompt Congress into statesman-like behavior in 
preparation for the next presidential election. 
C.  Forty-Seventh Congress 1881–1883:  A Virtual Tie in the Senate and 
Republican Majority in the House of Representatives 
In the 47th Congress, the Senate again considered the Edmunds Bill.  The 
debate was short and the Bill passed without issue.  The story was different 
in the House of Representatives where the bill failed by a vote of 93 for and 
100 against.195  The later debates had more depth so they are examined in 
more detail; it is noteworthy, however, that the Republican House rejected a 
plan that had been chiefly designed by Republicans in the Senate. 196 
D.  Forty-Eighth Congress 1883–1885:  The Democrats Control the House 
of Representatives and the Republicans Control the Senate 
The 48th Congress marked a shift in control, with Democrats clearly 
controlling the House of Representatives and Republicans controlling the 
Senate.  This appears to have shifted the debate over the electoral count as 
well, as the Senate actively proposed legislation, instead of joint rule, over 
the course of the next few years.  The debate also shifted to protecting the 
institutional prerogatives of the two Houses, rather than the political power 
of the two parties.  Once again, another exceedingly close presidential 
election was on the horizon in 1884, but that did not motivate the two 
parties to adopt a bipartisan compromise that would handle a potential 
dispute impartially. 
1.  Congress Considers the Edmunds Bill 
Senator Hoar re-introduced the Edmunds Bill, Senate Bill 25, on 
December 4, 1883.197  The Senate began consideration on January 16, 1884 
and Senator Hoar noted that the bill had the unanimous support of the 
Committee on Privileges and Elections and was the same as the bill that 
passed the Senate two winters before.198 The Bill, which had breezed 
through the tied Senate in the previous session, did the same in the 
Republican-controlled Senate without amendment or debate on January 16, 
1884.199 
 
 194. Id. at 1372. 
 195. 13 CONG. REC. 5149 (1882). 
 196. The House Democrats voted eighty-three for and zero against the bill.  The House 
Republicans voted five for and ninety-seven against the measure. 
 197. 15 CONG. REC. 12 (1883). 
 198. Id. at 430. 
 199. Id. 
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The Bill was referred to the Select Committee on the Law Respecting 
Election of President and Vice-President in the House on January 24.200  
The Committee came back with a report on April 10 and the Bill was 
placed on the House Calendar for debate.201  The House Committee 
amended the Senate Bill and Representative William W. Eaton (D, CT) 
presented the changes.202  The proposed changes were significant.  First, 
they eliminated the conclusive status given to electoral certificates produced 
as a result of a state’s election dispute mechanisms.203  Second, the 
amendment eliminated any attempts to bind the joint session into a 
particular decision governed by the circumstances and to prevent the joint 
session from rejecting votes.204  Instead, the amendment only sought to 
outline the procedures for dealing with the objections to a state’s electoral 
votes or double returns.  In the case of either, the resolution was submitted 
to the entire joint session.205  The joint session would engage in three hours 
of debate and then proceed to vote per capita by state to determine the 
resolution of the matter.206 
The House debated the new Bill over four days.  The arguments for and 
against the Senate Bill were not unlike the arguments advanced in prior 
sessions.207  For instance, Representative Alphonso Hart (R, OH) argued 
against the House amendment because it did not bind the joint session to 
particular outcomes; the outcome of any dispute would likely be determined 
by which party comprised the majority in the per capita voting.208  
Representative Abraham X. Parker (R, NY) noted that the House 
Democrats were knowingly awarding themselves an advantage with this 
plan because they would have a strong overall majority in a joint session, 
suggesting partisan motivations were still at play despite the split 
congressional power.209 
Likewise, arguments were made in favor of the amendment.  For 
instance, Representative Luke Pryor (D, AL), a member of the committee, 
argued that the House amendment was based on a faithful interpretation of 
the Constitution, which empowered the joint session, as a unique body, to 
resolve questions about the electoral vote.210  Still, House members 
 
 200. Id. at 638. 
 201. Id. at 2843. 
 202. Id. at 5076. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. at 5076–80, 5096–105, 5453–68, 5545–51. 
 208. Id. at 5454.  Representative Alphonso Hart also noted the criticism that the Electoral 
Commission received, even though, he argued, it was made up of some of the most 
distinguished jurists of the day.  If they were viewed in such a light, a partisan vote from the 
entire Congress would be worse. Id. 
 209. Id. at 5460 (noting the Democrats had a seventy-seven vote majority there). 
 210. Id. at 5096–105 
Having reached the conclusion that this board have been assembled under the 
provisions of the Constitution for a purpose that involves and implies action . . . I 
repeat and now insist that in this word vote is included the ascertainment and 
determination of all defects, irregularities, illegalities, non-qualifications of 
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recognized the urgency and timeliness of resolving the issue at that time.  
For instance, Republican Representative Hilary A. Herbert (D, AL) noted 
that it was time for Congress to pass a law given the impending presidential 
campaign and the fact that the Congress was split between the two 
parties.211 
Just before voting on the committee’s amendment, the House considered 
an amendment in the event the underlying amendment failed.  That 
amendment would have eliminated the word “conclusive” regarding a 
determination of an election dispute by the state, instead allowing it to be 
overruled by concurrent action of both Houses acting separately.212  The 
House voted on the amendment on June 24 and there were 127 yeas and 
eighty-two neas, with 114 not voting, so the amendment passed.213  With so 
many members not voting, it is difficult to determine whether it was a strict 
partisan vote, although all 116 Republicans voting in unison would not have 
defeated the yeas.  Senate Bill 25 was sent back to the Senate in its 
amended form and referred back to the Committee on Privileges and 
Elections.214  Senator Hoar had the Bill discharged from the committee and 
was granted unanimous consent for the Senate to non-concur to the changes 
and seek a conference.215  On June 28, the House agreed to a conference.216  
However, Senator Hoar reported back to the Senate that the conference was 
unable to agree on the question on February 13, 1885.217 
2.  The 1884 Presidential Election 
None of the sources reveal why the two parties were unable to agree.  
One thing did happen in the interim:  the 1884 presidential election.  A 
possibility is that the uncertainty of the outcome of the election, rather than 
galvanizing the conference to agree, made one party or the other wait to see 
if it might gain the Presidency and an upper hand on the issue later.  The 
situation was similar to that in 1876 insofar as Republicans controlled both 
the White House and the Senate going into the election.  They might have 
 
electors or persons voted for, frauds . . . or coercions, from the suffragan through 
its transit to this Federal board of inspectors, revisers, and determinants of last 
resort at the seat of the Government of the United States. 
 211. Id. at 5546 (“We are entering on what is likely to be a very exciting Presidential 
campaign.  The House is Democratic and the Senate is Republican, and if we adjourn this 
session without having agreed upon any rule or any law which shall regulate the count of the 
electoral vote we may have a deadlock again next winter . . . I believe that a bad law would 
be better than no law at all.”). 
 212. Id. at 5550.  Two other amendments were considered.  One was notable because it 
submitted disputes to the Supreme Court, rather than Congress.  That amendment was not 
approved. Id. 
 213. Id. at 5551.  The Democrats voted 122-17 for the amendment.  One Republican 
joined them, with sixty-three voting against it. 
 214. Id. at 5579. 
 215. Id. at 5689.  The Senators appointed to the conference were Senators Hoar, John 
Sherman (R, OH) and James L. Pugh (AL). Id. 
 216. 15 CONG. REC. at 5762.  The House appointed Representatives William W. Eaton, 
Risden T. Bennett (D, NC), and Hart to the conference.   
 217. 16 CONG. REC. 1618 (1884). 
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thought that by controlling the Presiding Officer in the Senate as well as the 
military, they would have the upper hand if the situation of 1876 repeated 
itself.  Conversely, the Democrats might have thought they could use their 
control of the House to prevail this time, even if they had not done so in 
1877. 
As in 1880, New York would be the “swing state” of the election.  An 
assassin’s bullet struck down President Garfield in September 1881, 
allowing his running mate Chester A. Arthur, a New Yorker, to assume the 
Presidency.  In 1882, President Arthur inserted himself in his home state’s 
politics by ensuring that his Secretary of the Treasury, Charles J. Folger, 
replaced the incumbent Governor as the Republican nominee for that 
office.218  The resulting bitterness helped the Democrat’s nominee, Stephen 
Grover Cleveland, to victory as Governor of New York.219  Just two years 
later, with the support of the Tilden political machine, Cleveland emerged 
as the Democrats’ nominee for the Presidency of the United States.220  This 
marked the third New Yorker to capture the nomination in the last four 
elections.221 
With the sitting governor of the likely swing-state taking the nomination, 
it is difficult to say how this might have played into the considerations of 
Democrats and Republicans in Congress.  The Democrats were likely more 
confident of their success and Cleveland’s ability to secure New York.  
Likewise, the Republicans, aware of the possibility of fraud with the 1880 
elections in mind, might have been more interested in having the ability to 
challenge New York’s returns, which would have been limited by the 
legislation under consideration.  President Arthur did not pursue the 
Republican nomination aggressively, perhaps due to contracting Bright’s 
disease,222 and the nomination went to former Maine Congressman and 
Secretary of State James G. Blaine.223 
The national election was quite close, with a slim popular vote margin, 
48.5% to 48.2% and 219 electoral votes to 182, both in favor of 
Cleveland.224  New York, the swing state, was even closer in 1884 than 
1880:  just less than 1100 votes, instead of 20,000, meaning a swing of just 
550 could have shifted the presidency to Blaine.225  With such a close 
margin, it took two weeks to resolve the outcome in New York and both 
parties enlisted the assistance of lawyers to review the official canvassing of 
 
 218. RICHARD E. WELCH, JR., THE PRESIDENCIES OF GROVER CLEVELAND 25 (1988). 
 219. Id. at 26.  Grover Cleveland was a relative political novice at the time; he had served 
as Sheriff of Erie County from 1871–1873 and was Mayor of Buffalo for only a few months 
before receiving the nomination for Governor. Id. at 24–25. 
 220. Id. at 28–29.  The support of Tilden came after there was some movement for a 
Tilden nomination in order to “revenge the ‘Steal of ‘76.’” Id. 
 221. Id. at 29. 
 222. THOMAS C. REEVES, GENTLEMAN BOSS:  THE LIFE OF CHESTER ALAN ARTHUR 317 
(1975).  Indeed, Chester A. Arthur died shortly after leaving office. Id. at 418.  
 223. Harper’s Weekly, The Presidential Elections:  1860–1912, available at 
http://elections.harpweek.com/1884/Overview-1884-4.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2010). 
 224. Id. 
 225. REEVES, supra note 222, at 40–41. 
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votes in New York.226  New York’s canvassing process, structured to 
include bipartisan observers, found Cleveland to be the winner and resulted 
in a relatively peaceful resolution.227 
Again, the irresponsibility of going into the 1884 presidential election 
without a procedure is remarkable.  What would have happened if New 
York had devolved into an 1876-like dispute?  Like in 1876, there were no 
procedures for dealing with this scenario and Congress was split between 
the two parties. Incredibly this close-call did not seem to raise serious 
concern among the various actors in Congress. 
Another factor might be crucial, however.  Senator Hoar’s Bill passed 
through the Senate with little objection from Senate Democrats.  It could be 
that the members of the two Houses thought each respective Bill went the 
furthest to protect their interests.  With such a wide difference between the 
House stance and the Senate stance, compromise would have been quite 
difficult.  Still, it is the obligation of statesmen to overcome such concerns 
in light of the overriding national interest, and this they failed to do. 
E.  Forty-Ninth Congress 1885–1887:  The Republicans Control the Senate 
and the Democrats Control the House of Representatives 
In 1887, Congress finally passed the Edmunds Bill.  For some reason, 
both Houses debated the issue from closer starting points.  Interestingly, 
both supported the Bill and opposition to it was quite bipartisan in this 
session.  Perhaps the closeness of the 1884 presidential election and the 
split control of Congress finally triumphed, bringing both Houses together. 
1.  Senate Considers the Edmunds Bill Again 
The next winter, the Senate reconsidered regulating the electoral count 
when Senator Edmunds introduced Senate Bill 9 in December 1885.228  
Senator Hoar reported back from the Committee on Privileges and 
Elections to place the Bill on the calendar without amendment.229  Debate 
on the Bill began formally on January 21, 1886, beginning with a speech 
from Senator John Sherman (R, OH).230  Senator Sherman was the 
Edmunds Bill’s chief antagonist during this debate, which is notable 
because Edmunds, Hoar, and Sherman were all prominent Republicans.231 
 
 226. FOLEY, supra note 171. 
 227. Id.  Indeed, James G. Blaine did not wish to challenge the canvassing process in 
court, finding it to be fair. DAVID SAVILLE MUZZEY, JAMES G. BLAINE:  A POLITICAL IDOL 
OF OTHER DAYS 324 (1934). 
 228. 17 CONG. REC.122 (1885). 
 229. Id. at 242. 
 230. Id. at 815. 
 231. Sherman was Republican Conference Chairman from 1884–1885 and President Pro 
Tempore of the Senate from 1885–1887.  He also served as Secretary of the Treasury for 
President Hayes and Secretary of State for President William McKinley.  Biography of John 
Sherman, BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS 1774–PRESENT, 
http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=S000346 (last visited Nov. 11, 
2010).  The Sherman Antitrust Act is, of course, named after him.  WINFIELD SCOTT KERR, I 
JOHN SHEMRAN:  HIS LIFE AND PUBLIC SERVICES, at Introduction (1908). 
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Senator Sherman noted that the timing again was good for passing a bill 
when Congress was free from “political bias”: 
[T]he bill that has twice passed the Senate and been sent to the House, 
rather with a view to gain a conference than otherwise, is now before us 
again.  A conference was defeated by the unwillingness of either House to 
abate its ideas on this question, and it now comes before us again at the 
beginning of an administration, when no party advantage can be derived 
from our decision, when the Senate is clearly on one side in party politics 
and the House clearly is on the other; and now, if ever, this matter ought 
to be settled upon some basis of principle.232 
However, Senator Sherman did not think the Bill was without flaw.  He 
particularly disagreed with section four, in the case of a state submitting a 
single set of returns, binding the joint session to accept those returns unless 
both Houses agreed to reject them.233  Senator Sherman argued that this 
gave weight to the opinion of one House in a disagreement over what might 
be an important matter.234  The greater flaw, according to Senator Sherman, 
was in the case of two returns and no determination of any dispute by the 
state.  There, the fourth section provided that only the returns that “the two 
Houses, acting separately, shall concurrently decide to be the lawful votes 
of the legally appointed electors of such State” would be counted.235 
Senator Sherman considered this section in the context of the previous 
election, when the vote margin in the state of New York was only a few 
thousand votes and could have flipped the electoral vote count.236  If there 
was a dispute over that margin, Senator Sherman argued that this provision 
would have encouraged both parties in New York to submit electoral 
certificates and given the partisan split in Congress, it was likely that New 
York’s vote would have been excluded altogether, by whichever House 
would gain a political advantage through rejecting the votes.237  Senator 
Sherman agreed that there should be “some tribunal provided to whom all 
questions should be referred.”238  The President of the Senate was 
undesirable as this ultimate tribunal because no individual should have such 
power,239 and the Supreme Court was undesirable because they should not 
 
 Senator Sherman voted against the Electoral Commission in 1877, but considered it to be a 
wise measure due to the potential for civil war. 17 CONG. REC. at 815. 
 232. 17 CONG. REC. at 815. 
 233. Id. 
 234. Id. at 816. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id.  Senator Sherman did not explain how the two groups of electors might have 
submitted votes, but he suggested that if there was a genuine issue or question about the 
validity of the results, both groups of electors would find a way to meet and cast ballots. See 
id. 
 237. Id.  Furthermore, Senator Sherman argued that allowing one House to exclude the 
returns of a state was not on firm constitutional ground. Id.  His point was not that Congress 
did not have power to regulate the electoral count but that under the Twelfth Amendment, 
the “vote[s] shall be counted” requires Congress to count some votes and not to reject votes. 
See id. at 817. 
 238. Id. 
 239. Id.  Although Senator Sherman thought that in the absence of legislation he might 
have some power. Id. 
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have to decide political questions.240  Therefore, Senator Sherman argued 
that the Congress, voting as one body, was capable of making this 
determination, in the event of double returns or a question about a single 
return when the two Houses could not agree separately.241 
The Senator submitted amendments to that effect that did not pass.242  
Sherman was clear as to why he advocated this “tribunal,” over other 
possible arbiters, like the President of the Senate or Supreme Court.  What 
is not clear is why he did not propose a bipartisan commission.  While he 
voted against the Electoral Commission, the vote was on constitutional 
grounds; otherwise, he thought it was successful.  Perhaps the key here was 
that he thought his amendment was possible through legislation, whereas 
another proposal could only be achieved through constitutional amendment.  
It does not appear that Sherman ever proposed a constitutional amendment 
on the subject. 
Senator Hoar took to the Senate floor in opposition to Senator Sherman’s 
plan.  In some ways, Senator Hoar was sympathetic to the idea of a single 
common arbiter for these sorts of disputes; he just fundamentally differed in 
thinking the role was judicial.243  Indeed, he thought that the Chief Justice 
of the Supreme Court would ably serve in the role of common arbiter.244  
But as a long supporter of the Edmunds Bill, Hoar had abandoned the hope 
that Congress might divest itself of this role.  His support of the Bill was 
based on the failed attempts of past members of Congress and the “present 
state of political and public sentiment in this country.”245  This admission, 
 
 240. Id. at 817–18 (“It would tend to bring that court into public odium or one or the other 
of the two great parties.”). 
 241. Id. at 818.  In doing so, Senator Sherman noted that the legislatures of Mexico and 
France were capable of operating in such a matter and acknowledged that it was unlikely his 
proposal would be well regarded in the Senate since the House outnumbered them. Id.  
Senator Edmunds responded by stating that they might as well amend the bill to give the 
House alone the judgment. Id. at 819.  Senator William M. Evarts (R, NY) argued the same 
against the amendments: 
I submit that the only debate here, and that is the way it has only been urged, is 
that the vote of the Senate and its protective power in the election is lost by the 
count in the general ballot of the two Houses connected.  I cannot but perceive that 
the methods proposed by the Senator from Ohio give one opportunity to the Senate 
to overcome the majority in the House by the count of the united votes of the two 
bodies. 
Id. at 820. 
 242. Id. 
 243. 17 CONG. REC. at 1020 (“A perfect bill, as I believe, would provide for a common 
arbiter between these two bodies, which the Constitution has left to the lawmaking power, 
and that has been the attempt of the statesmanship that has dealt with this subject from the 
beginning of the century to the present day; but every such attempt has failed.”).  This was 
because the function was not legislative or political, but judicial in nature. Id. (“[J]udicial in 
regard to the nature and character of the act to be performed; that is, you are to have a 
tribunal which is to determine the existing fact and the existing law, in contradistinction 
from determining the law or creating the facts according to his own desire . . . . It is a 
function into which the wish or the desire of the person exercising it can not properly 
enter.”). 
 244. Id. 
 245. Id. 
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by one of the chief supporters of the Edmunds Bill and leaders in the 
Senate, suggests that at this point all hope of systemic reform was lost. 
Senator Morgan, now in the minority, articulated the same views as he 
did in earlier debates and also argued that the Constitution was actually 
sufficient in its terms.246  Senator Hoar made an amendment that required a 
state’s governor to certify returns.247  After extensive debate, the Bill was 
recommitted to the Committee on Privileges and Elections.248  The Bill 
emerged from committee with a few amendments that went to the points 
brought up by Senator William M. Evarts and passed the Senate by voice 
vote. 
2.  The House Considers the Edmunds Bill 
On March 19th, the House of Representatives received the Bill from the 
Senate and referred it to the Select Committee on the Election of President 
and Vice-President.249  On April 15, the Committee returned with a report 
on the Senate version of the Bill.  Because the Democrats had the overall 
majority in the House, Democrats comprised the majority of the 
Committee.  Because the minority report was comprised entirely of 
Democrats, the majority must have been bipartisan.250  The majority report 
included two substantive amendments.  The first amendment prohibited the 
joint session from rejecting the votes of a state that that had “one lawful 
return.”251  Under the Senate version, the two Houses could reject a state 
that had a single return; the majority argued that they should not have this 
power, which differed from the early position taken by the Democrats when 
they controlled both Houses.252  This Amendment also inserted the word 
“lawful” before return, apparently leaving open the question about whether 
the two Houses could determine the single return was unlawful.253 
The second amendment altered the rules for when the two Houses were 
faced with multiple returns but not a determination from a state’s dispute 
resolution system.  In that case, the House amended the Senate Bill to give 
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because they can only count legal votes. Id. 
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the return certified by the state’s governor presumptive validity unless the 
two Houses voted to reject it.254  The majority did not like that the Senate 
version required both Houses to concur on the correct set of returns and 
gave no set of returns presumptive validity, presumably because this would 
give a single House the ability to entirely disenfranchise a state.255  Despite 
these amendments, the majority otherwise agreed in large part with the 
Senate Bill, for the first time in the course of the bipartisan Congress’s 
work on the subject.  Perhaps this was because, as expressed in the House 
Report, both political parties finally realized that “[t]he interests involved 
are too precious and the dangers too great to be left longer without adequate 
provisions against trouble and discord.”256 
The minority agreed with the first part of the first amendment, that the 
two Houses should not have the power to reject the returns of a state that 
submits only one return.257  However, the minority disagreed with inserting 
the word “lawful” into that provision because it would give Congress the 
prerogative to reject returns.258  The minority disagreed with the second 
amendment on the grounds that it allowed both Houses to reject a vote that 
had the governor’s certification, which would disenfranchise a state.259  The 
minority also disagreed with requiring a state to resolve a dispute six days 
before the meeting of the electors and to resolve the dispute using laws 
enacted prior to election day, believing both actions went beyond the 
Constitution in controlling the mechanisms of the state’s election and 
dispute resolution.260  The Report was submitted to the House on April 
30.261 
Debate on the Bill, with amendments, did not begin until December 7.262  
Representative Andrew J. Caldwell (D, TN), Chair of the Committee, was 
the only member to speak that day.  First, Representative Caldwell noted 
that the Bill would be an authoritative expression that the power of the 
electoral count was vested in Congress, not the President of the Senate.263  
Next, he noted that Congress has the ability to create a law or joint rule 
providing for the manner of counting the vote, and defended the power of 
Congress to judge the legality of the votes.264  Caldwell noted that the 
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intention of the amendments was to protect the states from any suggestion 
that the legislation might be used to improperly disenfranchise them; 
however, Caldwell emphasized that it was important not to go so far as to 
inhibit the ability of Congress to reject unlawful votes.265 
Representative Samuel Dibble (D, SC), a member of the minority report 
of the Committee, continued the debate on December 8.  His primary 
contention was that the electoral returns of a state that are certified under its 
laws should have prima facie validity when they arrive before Congress and 
neither House or both Houses should be able to set aside this return “when 
it is certified and presented in regular form and manner.”266  Additionally, 
Representative Dibble took issue with the safe harbor date and insisted that 
the states should have the full time until the electors cast their votes to 
resolve any controversies.  To do otherwise would impermissibly interfere 
with the state’s power to determine the electors.267  Dibble agreed that 
Congress was competent to legislate as to who had the counting power, but 
took issue with the idea that the count itself could be a judicial act, rather 
than a ministerial act of simply counting.268 
Dibble did acknowledge that the act generally sought to constrain 
Congress’s ability to judge the returns, but thought it still left Congress with 
too much ability to insert its will into a dispute.269  Despite the issues the 
minority of the Committee had with the Bill, Representative Dibble, in a 
signal that the Bill stood a good chance of passing, noted that for the most 
part, the Bill had the unanimous approval of the Committee and there were 
no dissents to the main features of the Bill.270  Representative William C. 
Cooper (R, OH), a member of the majority report of the Committee, 
defended the Bill’s intrusions upon the state as limited, only arising if the 
state has put itself into the position of submitting multiple returns.271  
Representative John R. Eden (D, IL) maintained that the Bill, with 
amendments, would effectively determine all questions and scenarios 
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relative to the electoral account while leaving the states to determine the 
disputes.272  Further, the necessity of the legislation was “manifest,” despite 
the fact that previous disputes were resolved peaceably; the law was still 
unsettled and invited future contests.273 
Representative George E. Adams (R, IL) maintained that he believed the 
Bill would not bind the two Houses of Congress when they actually count 
the electoral vote.274  Additionally, Representative Adams noted that the 
legislation included language that would still permit Congress to make 
judgments.  For instance, in the event of two sets of the returns, the Bill 
gave presumptive validity to those votes “regularly given.”275  This term, he 
argued, was entirely subjective and ambiguous.276  Debate wrapped up on 
December 9, and Representative Charles S. Baker (R, NY) rose to argue 
that the Bill was unconstitutional, on the grounds that it strips power from 
the President of the Senate and gives too much power to Congress.277  Any 
remedy, in Representative Baker’s mind, would have to take the form of a 
constitutional amendment, and he argued that this should have been the 
focus all along.278 
Wrapping up debate, Representative Herbert (D, AL), summarized the 
case for a law and the history of the progress in Congress since the Hayes-
Tilden disputed election: 
 Mr. Speaker, this bill has come over to us as I understand by a 
practically unanimous vote on the part of the Senate, Democrats and 
Republicans.  That body has four times passed and sent to this House this 
bill, or one very similar to it.  I hope the time has come when the House is 
at last ready to pass the bill in some shape or other. 
 No question has been more thoroughly and ably discussed in the last 
ten years than that involved in this bill—the counting the electoral vote.  
Eleven years ago the country was on the eve of civil war because we had 
a disputed Presidential election and no law provided under which the 
count could be made.  The Electoral Commission was resorted to.  The 
country submitted to the result, but was never satisfied with it.  It was the 
natural and perhaps the inevitable, result.  The country never will be 
satisfied in any political case with a temporary expedient or device under 
a law passed at the moment, after parties had taken sides on the question.  
The party losing under such circumstances will naturally believe it has 
been cheated.  The people of this country are law-loving and law-abiding, 
but they want laws passed before cases arise, and not with reference to 
any special case that may have arisen.  When a party loses a suit under a 
law passed beforehand, without reference to his particular case, even 
though he may believe injustice has been done him, has no feeling of 
personal wrong or personal indignation against the law-making power, 
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because he knows that human laws must be imperfect. . . . And therefore 
it is that an unjust law, an imperfect law, is better than no law at all.  Let 
the people know beforehand what the law is and what they are to 
expect.279  
The House took up the majority of the Committee’s amendments.  The 
Committee abandoned the insertion of the word “lawful” without a vote but 
the other amendments were agreed to.280  The amendments offered by the 
Committee minority were rejected.281  The Committee’s amendments 
passed by a vote of 141–109 with seventy-two members not voting.282  An 
additional amendment, making a slight change to the committee majority’s 
first substantive amendment, by Representative Eden was accepted and 
changed the rules to ensure the Houses could not reject the votes when a 
state submits a single return that has been “regularly given” and certified by 
the state executive.283 
Senator Hoar requested that the Senate non-concur in the House 
amendments and he, Senator Edmunds (R) and Senator James L. Pugh (D) 
were appointed to the conference committee.284  The House appointed their 
conference, Representatives Caldwell (D), Eden (D) and Cooper (R) on 
December 14.285  The House conferees reported back on January 20, 
1887.286 
As to the substantive amendments, the Senate conferees agreed in large 
part with the House, with a few changes.  The first substantive change dealt 
was to the House amendment on a state that submitted a single return that 
was certified by the state executive:  though no electoral votes may be 
rejected, the two Houses concurrently may reject the vote or votes when 
they agree that such vote or votes have not been so regularly given by 
electors whose appointment has been so certified.287 
The House Conference Report noted that this change would leave no 
doubt that Congress could still reject a single return that was certified by a 
state’s governor if it agreed that the return was not regularly given.288  The 
Senate accepted the second substantive House amendment and the only 
change the conference made was to the language of the second substantive 
House amendment.289  The report from the House conferees noted that the 
changes would ensure that a path for Congress was created for almost every 
circumstance of disputed returns and, in the event that it fails, the two 
Houses’ power would be circumscribed to a minimum to prevent the 
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disenfranchisement of a state.290  The Senate agreed to the conference 
report with little discussion on January 20.291  The President signed the 
Electoral Count Act on February 4, 1887. 
CONCLUSION 
The long meandering path to the Electoral Count Act, starting just after 
the Hayes-Tilden election dispute in 1876, was eleven years in all.  
Congress considered constitutional amendments, joint rule, and eventually 
settled on legislation.  It is clear that the nature of the early debate was 
framed by partisanship on the part of the Democrats, stemming from anger 
at the Hayes-Tilden disputes and what they considered to be abuse at the 
hands of Republicans during the Civil War and Reconstruction Eras.  The 
debate evolved as this partisanship tempered and control of Congress was 
split between the two parties.  Still, the biggest hurdle seems to have been 
the diversity of opinions various members of Congress had, a fact that 
perhaps accounts for why the Bill had to be bi-partisan.  In the end, the Bill 
marked two aims.  First, it attempted to resolve the question as to where the 
power to count electoral votes resides by asserting this authority to be in the 
joint session of Congress. 
But, of course, the legislation by itself cannot conclusively defeat the 
claim, based on the text of the Twelfth Amendment, that this authority lies 
with the President of the Senate—or alternatively, the argument that it lies 
exclusively with the House of Representatives in the event that there is a 
debate whether any candidate has obtained a majority of Electoral College 
votes.  Second, it sought to protect the state’s prerogative to cast electoral 
votes by allowing the states to give their votes presumptive validity through 
election dispute laws and resolution and restricting the discretion of 
Congress. 
So why was Congress finally able to enact a statute in 1887, before the 
1888 presidential election, rather than earlier, perhaps before the 1884 
presidential election?  The Edmunds Bill was essentially the same in both 
years, and the partisan makeup of Congress was the same in both years, 
with Republicans controlling the Senate and Democrats controlling the 
House of Representatives.  It is unclear why the conference on the Bill was 
unable to come to an agreement in 1884–1885 but was successful in this 
respect in 1887.  One difference was a Republican President before the 
1884 election and a Democratic President, Grover Cleveland, before the 
1888 election, although it does not seem that this would have made a 
practical difference in the particular circumstances: Cleveland’s Vice-
President, Thomas Hendricks, died in office, and thus the Republican 
President pro tem of the Senate (John Ingalls) would supervise the counting 
of Electoral votes under the Twelfth Amendment.  The election of 1880 was 
close, but not in the same way the 1884 election was, with a deciding 
margin of less than 1100 votes in New York.  Two close successive 
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elections must have had an impact on Congress, particularly since both 
focused on the battleground state of New York, where allegations of fraud 
and corruption were frequent on both sides.  The especially narrow results 
in 1884 must have amplified concerns.  Congress must have also known 
that the 1888 election would likely come down to another close battle in 
New York, so they would have been wise to take these narrow scrapes with 
disaster to heart.  The 1888 election was indeed quite close, this time with 
Benjamin Harrison narrowly defeating Grover Cleveland by 14,000 votes in 
New York to secure the Presidency.292 
The ultimate compromise was not necessarily hailed as a panacea.  John 
W. Burgess, a father of the field of political science,293 published a scathing 
criticism of the Electoral Count Act in 1888.294  He regarded the Act as a 
failure in several ways.  First, it was incredibly complex, but despite the 
complexity (or perhaps because of it) it was often ambiguous or even failed 
to account for various scenarios.295  Much of the law required Congress to 
accept votes that are “regularly given,” but Burgess noted that this language 
is entirely ambiguous and without a single interpretation could lead the law 
to operate in several different ways.296  Burgess was also especially critical 
of what he saw was an abdication of Congress’s constitutional duty to 
police the returns from the states and to reject improper electoral votes by 
such measures as requiring both Houses to concur in order to reject a state’s 
single return.297  Burgess hoped that this “makeshift . . . compromise” 
would be temporary and Congress might eventually come to an agreement 
to establish a “common arbiter between the two Houses.”298 
There is no doubt criticisms leveled by Burgess were warranted.  Indeed, 
the first time the law was set to be tested, in 2000, confusion about the 
statute reigned as “politicians, lawyers, commentators, and Supreme Court 
justices seemed prone to misstate or misinterpret the provisions of the law, 
even those provisions which were clear to the generation that wrote 
them.”299  Perhaps then it is not surprising that some members of the 
Supreme Court seemed to think intervention was necessary.  However, 
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Court intervention was not something the framers of the ECA would have 
envisioned, particularly since Congress consistently rejected the Court as an 
arbiter of these disputes during this period. 
So in this regard, Burgess’ criticisms were quite accurate:  the ECA was 
a failure and the drafters of the ECA would have been surprised by the 
Court’s decision.  Criticism of the ECA and Congress is warranted from an 
objective standpoint as Congress certainly missed the opportunity to enact a 
serious reform of the system.  At the same time, perhaps we should be 
grateful that any legislation was enacted at all, given the partisan strife and 
inability to reach a compromise in the ten years following the Hayes-Tilden 
dispute.  The ECA compromise relied on effectively stripping Congress’s 
power to reject votes or exercise discretion as much as possible.  Perhaps 
this was the correct lesson for Congress to learn from the Civil War and 
Reconstruction Era; the Framers of the Constitution were mistaken to give 
this power to Congress.  And perhaps too it was impossible to expect 
Congress to deposit that power in any other body, especially if such a 
solution required constitutional amendment, since such a compromise 
would have required even more support. 
Still, the problems with the Twelfth Amendment and Electoral Count Act 
remain.  If intervention by the Supreme Court is not a desirable solution, 
then Congress must act again to fix this gap in presidential succession.  
There is no reason that Congress could not consider solutions now, but one 
lesson from the Electoral Count Act is that the measure must and should be 
bipartisan; thus it might be best for any serious debate to take place during a 
period of some level of shared power between Republicans and Democrats.  
Additionally, Bush v. Gore certainly stirred partisan sentiments in the 
country, but not to the same degree that Hayes-Tilden did because of the 
historical context of that dispute.  As the ten year anniversary of the Bush v. 
Gore decision approaches, the relative recentness of the events should be 
used as an opportunity to revisit the narrowly avoided constitutional crisis 
and think about how we might avoid the next one. 
To that end, now is the perfect time for all interested parties to make 
proposals.  Senator Edmunds hoped the Electoral Commission might serve 
the role of neutral arbiter of the Hayes-Tilden dispute, and Senator Hoar 
thought some body other than Congress was the best arbiter of future 
disputes.  Even with the attempts to tie the hands of Congress with the 
Electoral Count Act, it looked as if Congress might face deadlock and 
partisanship under the ECA in 2000.  These ideals of Senators Edmunds 
and Hoar should not be lost on us today, and the goal should be to make 
some other neutral or bipartisan body the arbiter of these disputes. 
The point is not to let the aftermath of Bush v. Gore and the continuing 
interest in electoral reform during this past decade become another lost 
opportunity, in the way that the decade after the Hayes-Tilden dispute 
regrettably was.  Recognizing the difficulties of overcoming the partisan 
and institutional obstacles to reform, one should also understand the 
paramount national need to surmount these difficulties.  The next time there 
is a disputed presidential election and there is a partisan deadlock in 
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Congress, as there was in 1876 and 2000, let us hope that there has been 
sufficient leadership to give the nation an authoritative and evenhanded 
tribunal that can fairly adjudicate the dispute. 
 
